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I. INTRODUCTN-THE ISSUE OF VESTED RIGHTS
The interface between a government's right to exercise police power and
a citizen's right to use private property is one of the most celebrated topics
in American constitutional jurisprudence.' Judicial attempts to establish "bright
lines" marking the boundaries of this interface have produced inconsistent
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P.C.; J.D. (1963), George Washington University; B.A. (1960), University of the South.
** Associate, Hazel, Thomas, Fiske, Beckhorn & Hanes, P.C., J.D. (1984), Washington
& Lee University; A.B. (1980), Duke University.
1. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, -, 107 S. Ct. 3141,
3146-47 (1987) (nexus required between police power exaction sought and legitimate policy
objective); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
-, 107, S. Ct. 2378, 2386 (1987) (police power exercise over land use rights can give rise to
taking of private property); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-63 (1980) (police power
exercise over land use rights do not amount to taking of private property); Penn. Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (police power exercise that does not cause
"physical invasion" onto private property is not taking); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279
(1928) (destruction of private property to protect public health, safety, and welfare is not taking);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (zoning classifications do not
affect taking of private property); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)
(police power exercise that goes "too far" effects taking of private property); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 644-45 (1887) (police power exercise that renders existing legal business illegal does
not affect taking of private property); Dainese v. Cooke, 91 U.S. 580, 583-84 (1875) (police
power exercise that renders previously issued building permit invalid effects taking of private
property). Compare Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 501-02
(1987) (Pennsylvania statute that requires fifty percent of coal deposits located under public
buildings to remain undisturbed does not affect taking of private property) with Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922) (Pennsylvania statute forbidding coal mining
that may cause subsidence of any public building effects taking of private property). See generally
B. AcKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTON (1977); N. Bowia, ToWARDs A NEw
THEORY OF DisTmuTrrivE JUSTICE (1971); R. EPsTEiN, TAKINos, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
PowER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); E. FREuNt , THE PoIicE PONvER (1904) [hereinafter FREuND];
Humback, A Unifying Theory For the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public
Use, 34 RuTrERs L. REv. 243 (1982); Michelman, Property As A Constitutional Right, 38 WASH.
& LEE L. RaV. 1097 (1981); Ragsdale, Guide to Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence: A Synthesis
and Integration of Supreme Court Precedent Regarding the Regulatory Taking of Land, 55
UMKC L. REv. 213 (1987) [hereinafter Ragsdale]; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter Sax I]; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 149 (1971) [hereinafter Sax II].
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rulings and confusing pronouncements of law. 2 Constitutional law professors
2. See supra note I (citations to United States Supreme Court cases); McGinley, Regulatory
"Takings". The Remarkable Resurrection of Economic Substantive Due Process Analysis in
Constitutional Law, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10369, 10370-89; Ragsdale, supra note
1, at 216-19; Sallet, Regulatory "Takings" and Just Compensation: The Supreme Court's Search
for a Solution Continues, 18 UPB. LAW. 635-57 (1986); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and
Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057 (1980) [hereinafter Stoebuck]. One scholar aptly
noted that "the collection decisions of the Supreme Court, and all other courts, leave the subject
as disheveled as a ragpicker's coat." See Stoebuck, supra at 1059 n.1l.
In the celebrated case of Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
Justice Holmes provided an unimpeachable but difficult to apply definition of "bright line"
between the legitimate exercise of police power and the unconstitutional taking of private property
through governmental regulations. He reasoned that "I[t]he general rule at least is, that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. In articulating his "bright line," however, Justice
Holmes did not distinguish, contrast, or even cite a previous "bright line" rule articulated by
Justice Harlan thirty-five years earlier in the case of Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
In Mugler Justice Harlan stated that "[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for
purposes that are declared by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety
of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property
for the public benefit." Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69. Justice Brandeis, in a dissent from the
Pennsylvania Coal opinion, chastised the majority for failing to apply the Mugler test and for
refusing to recognize that the Pennsylvania statute at issue was basically a nuisance-preventive
measure. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 417-20 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Six years after the Pennsylvania Coal decision, the United States Supreme Court partially
vindicated Justice Brandeis' position and ruled that private property rights do not exist in declared
nuisances and that governments possess the unfettered right to obliterate declared nuisances
without paying compensastion. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928). Interestingly
enough, Justice Holmes later claimed that his Pennsylvania Coal "bright line" rule harmonized
with the Supreme Court's later pronouncement concerning the law of nuisance abatement. See
M. HowE, Ho _.mS-POLLOCK LEamns-Tm CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JusncE HoLMES AND SIR
FREDERICK PoLtoCK, 1874-1932 (1941).
As a confusing but appropriate footnote to the Pennsylvania Coal debate, the United States
Supreme Court, in the 1987 Keystone Bituminous Coal decision, effectively overruled Justice
Holmes' holding that the Pennsylvania soil subsidence statute at issue caused a taking of private
property, but three months later issued another land use opinion premised indirectly upon Justice
Holmes "bright line" rule. Compare Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825,
-, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3148 (1987) (requiring nexus between government-imposed land use
prohibition and government's justification for prohibition) with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481-85 (1987) (explaining that Pennsylvania Coal analysis does
not apply to facts in Keystone). See also Roberts, Mining with Mr. Justice Holmes, 30 VAND.
L. REv. 287 (1986); Stewart, Overruling Oliver-Fifth Amendment Challenge to State-Imposed
Limited on Coal Mining, 73 A.B.A. J. 55 (May 1987); Comment, Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis and the Status of Coal in Pennsylvania, 11 HAnv. J.L. & PUBL.
PoL'y 227 (1988). See generally Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, I B.Y.U. J. PUL. L.
261, 187-303 (1987); Hippler, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory Taking
Doctrine: The Principles of "Noxious Use," "Average Reciprocity of Advantage," and "Bundle
of Rights" from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENvTL. Ass. L. Ray. 653 (1987).
As is demonstrated by Pennsylvania Coal and its progeny, even the best of "bright lines" lose
their luminosity over time. Justice Blackmun, in a 1985 opinion, described the Pennsylvania Coal
"bright line" test as "the lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark." See
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
172, 199 n.17 (1985).
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teach our nation's first year law students that American citizens hold all
private property rights subject to the valid exercise of the government's police
power and that the diminishment of these private property rights caused by
this valid exercise of government police power is not subject to just compen-
sation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 3 Yet, these same law
professors also teach that the government cannot use its police power to
effect a taking of private property. This action, they teach, is regulation that
goes "too far" and becomes instead a de facto exercise of eminent domain
power requiring just compensation. 4 Inevitably, some of these first year
students become our nation's judges and are called upon to decide land use
regulatory cases. As judges, these former students recall the lectures of their
first-year professors and attempt, in actual case scenarios, to determine when
certain land use regulations possessing facial validity go "too far." These
attempts have fostered the development of an area of land use law commonly
referred to as "vested rights." 5
3. See 1 R. ANDERsoN, AMERicAN LAw OF ZONING § 3.06 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
ANDERSON]; C. ANTiEAu, MODERN CONSTTUONAL LAW: THE INDrvmuAL AND THE GovEP.RNMErr
§§ 3:1-3:8 (1969) [hereinafter ANTrEAu]; F. BossEMAN, D. CAILIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKINGS
ISsUE 208-10, 318-19 (1973); FREuND, supra note I; D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.01
(1988) [hereinafter MANDELKER]; A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING §§ 2.01-.03 (5th ed. 1987) [hereinafter RATHCOPF]; P. ROHIAN, ZONNG AN LAND USE
CONTROLs § 1.05 (1988) [hereinafter RoEI-N]. See also Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging By
Police Power; The Search For Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1 (1970).
The so-called "police power" of government is an inherent, unspecified power to protect
public health, safety, and welfare. As an incident of sovereignty, this police power is neither
expressly mentioned or defined in the United States Constitution or in the constitutions of the
various states. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Miller v. Board of Pub.
Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925); Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877,
882 (Mo. 1962); Stickley v. Givens, 176 Va. 548, 557, 11 S.E.2d 631, 636 (1940). See generally
FRE UND, supra note 1; Stoebuck, supra note 2.
4. See ANDERoN, supra note 3, at § 30.17; ANTIEu, supra note 3, at § 3.2; MANDEWKER,
supra note 3, at §§ 2.01, 2.16, 2.23, 2.34; RATmcOPF supra note 3, at §§ 6.01-6.06; RoHAN,
supra note 3, at §§ 52A.01, 52A.02, 52A.03. See generally Michaelman, Takings, 1987, 88
CoLTuM. L. REv. 1600 (1988).
As discussed in note 3, supra, Justice Holmes originated the "too far" test in his Pennsylvania
Coal opinion. Despite the apparent overruling or distinguishing of Pennsylvania Coal in Keystone,
the United States Supreme Court still finds merit in the "too far" test. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at
- 107 S. Ct. at 3148. Indeed, the Nollan court provided additional gloss onto the test by
stating that a land use regulation mandating dedication of private land interests for public purposes
goes too far and becomes "an out-and-out plan of extortion." Id.
5. See infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text. As used in this article, the term "vested
rights" refers to those rights to use or develop real property that cannot be stripped by regulatory
action or governmental edict without payment of just compensation. The term is also used, in a
slightly different sense, in employment law and welfare rights law to define a right or interest
the infringement of which would violate public policy or "shock" society's sense of justice. See
Comment, The Variable Quality of a Vested Right, 34 YALE L. J. 303, 307 (1925).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "vested rights" as those "[rnights which have so completely
and definitely accrued to ... a person that they are not subject to be defeated or canceled by
the act of any other private person, and which it is right and equitable that the government
should recognize and protect, as being lawful in themselves .... ", BLACK's LAW Dicnoua Y
1989]
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A vested right to use private property is a right that is immune to the
governmental exercise of its police power.6 The exercise of regulatory police
power that causes the diminishment of a vested right is one that goes "too
far."7 Implicit in the past two sentences is the basis for much of the confusion
in the law of vested rights.' Some of our judges examine the nature of the
power exercised by government when adjudicating vested rights cases while
other judges examine the nature of the private property rights affected. This
1402 (5th ed. 1979), One scholar has defined "vested rights" as those rights that are "sacred
and inviolable," or are such as the [benefitted] parties ought not to be deprived by the legislature.
J, GRAY, Tim RUmE AoArsT PEi'ETurrms 98 & n.l (3d ed. 1915) [hereinafter GRAY]. As noted
below, the term "vested rights" in the context of land use and development rights may be
analyzed as pure proprietary rights deserving Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protections and
as specific areas into which governmental regulation may not be extended. See infra notes 31-
51, and accompanying text (discussing "pure vested rights" and "zoning estoppel" approaches).
6. See C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN, & D. PORTER, VEsTED RIOtrsT-BAIANcINO PuBIuc AND
PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS 49 (1982) [hereinafter SmMON]; Heeter, Zoning Estoppel:
Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 15
URB. L. ANN. 63, 65 (1971) [hereinafter Heeter]; see, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc.
v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 791, 553 P.2d 546, 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386,
390, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977); Pure Oil Div. v, City of Columbia, 254 S.C. 28, 34,
173 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1970); Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 358,
292 S.E.2d 799. 801 (1972); see also infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (discussing "pure
vested rights" doctrine).
7. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 US. at 415; Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New
York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 593-94, 385 N.Y,S.2d 5, 8, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384-85, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 990 (1976); SEMoN, supra note 6, at 49; Heeter, supra note 6, at 64-65; see also infra notes
35-42 and accompanying text (discussing "zoning estoppel" doctrine). As noted in SMMON, a
scholarly debate exists regarding whether or not the difference between a valid police power
exercise and one which goes "too far" is one of degree or one which involves discrete distinction
in kind, See SIEMON, supra note 6, at 57-58. Justice Brennan, in his dissent to the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, considered
Justice Holmes "too far" analysis and stated that "[tlhe determination of a 'taking' is 'a question
of degree,"' 450 U.S. 621, 649 (1981). The authors in SiEMoN suggest that Justice Brennan
misconstrues the "too far" analysis and state that Justice Holmes considered a police power
exercise that goes "too far" as one that is wholly distinct in kind from one which does not. See
SIEMON, supra note 6, at 58-59. Justice Holmes, they state, believed that a police power exercise
that goes "too far" metamorphoses into an exercise of eminent domain requiring just compen-
sation. Id. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416. But see Beuscher, Notes on the Integration
of Police Power and Eminent Domain by the Courts: Inverse Condemnation in J. BEUSCHER &
R. WRiGHT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND Usa 722, 724 (1969) ("those writers who emphasize
the separate air-tight, non-overlapping character of the two basic powers-police power and
eminent domain-have been too glib").
8. See SIEMON, supra note 6, at 49. The authors in SrEMON describe a phenomenon which
they term "the vesting paradox." They note that "[e]ven though all property rights are held
subject to the police power, a vested right to develop is immune from exercises of the police
power." Id. As described below, proponents of the "pure vested rights" doctrine solve the
paradox by determining that a vested right is a very special legal interest that possesses more
constitutional proprietary "weight" than a mere property right; it is, they believe, a "super
property" right. Proponents of the "zoning estoppel" doctrine do not distinguish between vested
rights and other property rights. They solve the paradox, however, by determining that a police
power exercise that impacts a vested right loses its police power status and becomes instead an
exercise of eminent domain power.
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divergence has produced two different theoretical approaches to the vested
rights issue that have, through imprecise application, become hopelessly
muddled.9 We term these two theoretical approaches the "zoning estoppel"
approach and the "pure vested rights" approach, respectively.' 0 Basically, the
former approach considers the police power exercised while the latter considers
the private property interest affected.
II. OvERvIEw-Tim NATURE OF VESTED RIoHTS
Vested rights issues arise more frequently today than in the past because
of ever increasing volatility of land use regulations." In Virginia and elsewhere,
local governments have become extremely creative in extending the scope of
their police powers to address real and perceived concerns relating to popu-
lation, transportation, and public facilities. Local governments generally are
not reluctant to use these powers to mollify complaints sounded by the
electorate. 2 In rapidly developing jurisdictions, government-sponsored initia-
9. See MANDELKER, supra note 3, at § 6.12; Heeter, supra note 6, at 66 n.5; Stoebuck,
supra note 2, at 1059; see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Cahill, 54 F.2d 453, 454 (D.C. Cir.
1931) (city estopped because landowner had acquired vested rights); Raley v. California Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 977, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 707 (1977) ("vested
rights rule" is simply "a special expression of the general estoppel doctrine"); Allen v. City &
County of Honolulu, 58 Haw. 432, 435, 571 P.2d 328, 329 (1977) (both doctrines applied with
identical results); Marziani v. Lake County Zoning Board of Appeals, 87 Ill. App. 3d 425, 429,
409 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1980) (estoppel relief granted in jurisdiction that did not recognize doctrine
of zoning estoppel); Town of Marblehead v. Deery, 356 Mass. 532, 537-38, 254 N.E.2d 234, 237-
38 (1969) (town estopped because of unspecified equitable principles); see also Cunningham &
Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land Development Process, 29 HAsrinos L. J. 623,
626 (1978) [hereinafter Cunningham & Kremer].
10. See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of zoning estoppel);
infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of pure vested rights).
11. See Campanella, Elliott, & Merriam, New Vested Property Rights Legislation: States
Seek to Steady a Shaky Judicial Doctrine, 11 Zoning & Plan. L. Rep. 81, 81-82 (1988) [hereinafter
Campanella]; Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 9, at 626-28; Delaney & Kominers, He Who
Rests Less, Vests Best: Acquisition of Vested Rights in Land Development, 23 ST. Louis U. L.
J. 219, 219-20 (1979) [hereinafter Delaney & Kominers]; Witt, Vested Rights in Land Uses-A
View From the Practitioner's Perspective, 21 R.L PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 317, 317-18 (1986)
[hereinafter Witt]; Witt and Sammartino-Gardner, Growth Management v. Vested Rights: One
City's Experience: A Case Study of San Diego, 20 URB. LAW. 647, 647-56 (1988) [hereinafter
Witt & Sammartino-Gardner]. See generally Cable & Hauck, The Property Owner's Shield-
Nonconforming Uses and Vested Rights, 10 WnxAum'r L. J. 404 (1974); Note, Good Faith
Erpenditures in Reliance on Building Permits as a Vested Right in North Carolina, 49 N.C.L.
REv. 197 (1970); Note, Vested Rights and Land Use Development, 54 Opx L. Rav. 103 (1975);
Recent Cases, Building Permits-Vested Rights Thereunder In Pennsylvania-A New Rule, 73
DICK. L. REv. 578 (1968-69).
12. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Fralin & Waldron, Inc., 222 Va. 218, 229, 278
S.E.2d 859, 865 (1981) (Henrico County Board downzoning of property zoning for multi-family
uses because of intense citizen opposition held invalid); Board of Supervisors v. God, 216 Va.
163, 165, 217 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1975) (Arlington County Board refusal to rezone property for
multi-family uses because of "serious water problems" held invalid), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088
(1976). Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 148, 216 S.E.2d 199, 212 (1975) (James
City County Board rezoning of general commercial property to "Business Tourist Entry District"
1989]
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tives to amend zoning ordinances and zoning maps frequently occur in the
months before elections. 3 These legislative acts often diminish the land use
rights held by certain affected landowners. Therefore, arguments by affected
landowners that their property should be exempted from the new legislative
acts under vested rights theories soon arise before, during, and after enactment
of zoning ordinance and map changes.
While these affected landowners may either support or oppose the ques-
tioned zoning ordinance or zoning map amendment on general "good plan-
ning" grounds, they undoubtedly will claim that their existing or planned
land uses should receive exemption from the new legislation. If local govern-
zoning district to improve highway corridor aesthetics held invalid); Board of Supervisors v.
Home, 216 Va. 113, 122, 215 S.E.2d 453, 459 (1975) (Fairfax County Board enactment of
moratorium on filing of site plans and subdivision plats to halt development because of growth
management concerns held invalid); Board of Supervisors V. Williams, 216 Va. 49, 61, 216
S.E.2d 33, 41 (1975) (Fairfax County Board refusal to rezone property to denser single-family
detachment residential zoning district because of inadequate public facilities held invalid); City
of Richmond v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, 514, 211 S.E.2d 56, 62 (1975) (Richmond City Council
refusal to grant special use permit allowing limited office uses because of intense citizen opposition
held invalid); Board of Supervisors v. Allman, 215 Va. 434, 446, 211 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1975)
(Fairfax County Board refusal to rezone property to denser single-family detached residential
zoning district because of inadequate public facilities and crowded schools held invalid), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 940 (1975); Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 661, 202
S.E.2d 889, 894 (1974) (recently elected Fairfax County Board piecemeal downzoning of property
zoned for high and medium density residential uses because of previously made political promises
to limit growth held invalid); Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters. Inc., 214 Va. 235, 239,
198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1973) (Fairfax County Board enactment of zoning requirement mandating
large residential development projects to provide minimum of 15% low and moderate income
housing because of inadequacies in local housing stock held invalid); Boggs v. Board of
Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 492, 178 S.E.2d 508, 510-11 (1971) (Fairfax County Board refusal to
rezone low density residentially zoned property surrounded by commercially zoned and high
density residentially zoned property because of growth management concerns held invalid); Board
of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 662, 107 S.E.2d 390, 396-97 (1959) (Fairfax County
Board rezoning of western portion of county to large lot, low density residential zoning district
to restrict growth held invalid); see also Aldre Properties, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, Chancery
No. 78,463-A (Fairfax County Circuit Ct. Jan. 7, 1985) (Fairfax County Board downzoning of
400,000 acres to protect source of drinking water held valid by trial court); Camelot Builders,
Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, Chancery No. 38,968 (Fairfax County Circuit Ct. June 6, 1973)
(Fairfax County Board enactment of moratorium on issuance of sewer taps held invalid by trial
court). See generally Hazel, Growth Management Through Litigation: Urban Land (Nov. 1976)
[hereinafter Hazel] (manuscript available at Washington & Lee University Law Review Office);
Witt & Sammartino-Gardner, supra note 11.
13. E.g., Fairfax County, Va., Proposed Zoning Ordinance Amendment to Reduce Maxi-
mum Allowable Floor Area Ratios (FAR's) for High Traffic Generating Uses in the 1-3, 1-4, I-
5, and 1-6 Zoning Districts (proposed Nov. 17, 1986, defeated Dec. 29, 1986); Fairfax County,
Va., Proposed Zoning Map Amendment to Rezone 40,000 Acres in Occoquan Basin Watershed
to R-C (Rural-Conservation) Zoning District (Rezoning Application RZ 82-W-054 July 26, 1982);
Fairfax County, Va., Proposed Zoning Ordinance Amendment to Require Fifteen Percent of All
Units Constructed in Residential Projects Containing Fifty or More Units to be Dedicated for
Low and Moderate Income Families (Zoning Ordinance Amendnient 156, Sept. 1, 1971), declared
unconstitutional, Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters. Inc., 214 Va. 235, 238, 198 S.E.2d
600, 602 (1973).
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ments are sympathetic to the claims raised by the affected landowners or
concerned about potential litigation regarding the legality of the new legislation
in question, the governments may choose to "grandfather" certain land uses
by providing specific exemptions from the new legislation. 4 While grandfath-
ered rights may allow affected landowners the same exempted land uses as
would true vested rights, grandfathered rights are simply the result of legis-
lative grace and do not possess the constitutional underpinnings of vested
rights.' 5
The success that these affected landowners will encounter in court should
they choose to press forward on vested rights claims hinges on a multitude
of distinct but interrelated factors. Some of these factors are within the
control of the affected landowners, but others are not. The most important
factor is the nature of the controlling statutory and case law in the jurisdiction
in which the land subject to the new legislation is located. This factor, which
is beyond the landowners' control in most circumstances, determines the point
at which zoning estoppel attaches or vested rights accrue. Additionally, the
nature of controlling statutory and case law determines the legal adequacy of
the landowners' development actions prior to the new legislation, which may
give rise to zoning extoppel or vested rights claims. Regrettably, this factor
varies in extreme degrees from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 6 As one writer
correctly noted, there exists within American states and territories "an amor,
phous body of vested rights and estoppel law that determines when developers
are protected from land use regulations.' 7
Vested rights and estoppel law are so amorphous that attempts to delineate
majority and minority rules are practically useless.' 8 Writers who have at-
14. E.g., FAwAx CouNTY, VA. ZoNwNo ORDINANCE § 2-103 (1978) deleted Dec. 29, 1986.
Prior to a December 29, 1986 action by the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, the Fairfax
County Zoning Ordinance possessed the following "grandfather" provision:
2-103 Plans, Buildings Previously Approved. Nothing in this Ordinance shall be deemed
to require any change to the plans or buildings approved prior to the effective date
of this Ordinance as set forth in the Fairfax County Public Facilities Manual.
Id. The term "grandfather clause" originated from the constitutions of several southern states
that exempted lineal descendants of those registered to vote before 1867 from poll taxes and
literacy and property requirements. See SIEMON, supra note 6, at 73 n.4.
15. See SIEMON, supra note 6, at 73-77. In some jurisdictions, a landowner possessing
grandfathered development rights must diligently pursue development in accordance with these
rights or face the possibility of losing these rights. See, e.g., Fairfax County Public Facilities
Manual § 1-0500 et seq. (as amended 1985) (due diligence standards), deleted Dec. 29, 1986.
16. See infra notes 31-56 and accompanying text (discussing state vested rights and zoning
estoppel standards).
17. MANDELKER, supra note 3, at § 6.11.
18. See SIEMON, supra note 6, at 12-13; Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 9, at 626-28;
Hagman, The Vesting Issue: The Rights of Fetal Development Vis a Vis the Abortions of Public
Whimsy, 7 ENv-m. L. 519 (1977). The courts themselves have contributed to this degree of
amorphousness by handing down opinions that conflict with previously rendered opinions. See
SmMON, supra note 6, at 50-52 (describing two Florida District Court of Appeals decisions handed
down by same trial judge, involving same contested land use regulation, in which one Sanibel
Island developer was found to possess vested rights and another Sanibel Island developer was
found not to possess vested rights).
19891
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tempted to craft such a delineation have discussed the distinction between
"building permit required" and "building permit not required" jurisdictions
and between "early vesting" and "late vesting" jurisdictions. 19 Although these
attempts are helpful to the practitioner in providing a general overview of
the law in this area, they fail in providing exact categorization.
While affected landowners cannot control the nature of the controlling
organic law in their respective jurisdictions, they can control other factors
that assist in determining whether a zoning estoppel or vested rights claim
may succeed. For example, a landowner may control the nature and extent
of prelegislation development planning and execution, the amount of expen-
ditures dedicated toward ultimate development, and his or her own indicia
of good faith reliance upon existing local law prior to the new legislation.
The modem "critical path" 2 landowners must follow to build on their land
involves a formidable array of legislative and administrative approvals that
can involve years of effort prior to issuance of a building permit. A basic
appreciation of this critical path is fundamental to understanding the concepts
of zoning estoppel and vested rights.
The critical path is well demonstrated in Fairfax County, Virginia. The
land development processes in Fairfax County undoubtedly reflect the proc-
esses adopted in other jurisdictions bordering major urban centers that have
undergone tremendous growth in the post-World War II era.21 Moreover,
Fairfax County is representative of other "urban fringe" jurisdictions that
have utilized both legal and illegal land development ordinances and proce-
dures in attempts to control growth.Y These jurisdictions have proved to be
fertile breeding grounds for much of the modem case law involving vested
rights. In fact, the two major vested rights decisions handed down by the
Supreme Court of Virginia have both originated in Fairfax County."
19. See MANDELKER, supra note 3, at §§ 6.14, 6.15 (describing "building permit required"
and "building permit not required" jurisdictions); Campanella, supra note 11, at 85-86 (distin-
guishing majority and minority rules); Curtin & Zischke, Development Agreements: Securing
Vested Rights and Project Completion Benefits, 11 ZoNwG & P.Aa. L. Rm,. 25, 26-27 (1988)
[hereinafter Curtin & Zischke] (distinguishing majority and minority rules); Note, Developers'
Vested Rights, 23 Uan. L. ANN. 489 (1982) [hereinafter Developers' Rights] (describing "late
vesting" and "early vesting" rules).
20. See generally DEPRTMENT OF ENvTL. MANAo ENT, COUNTY OF FAntAx, VMGInA, A
GUIDE To THE DEvELoPMENrr PROCESS I FA IRAx COUNTY (1983) [hereinafter FAIRFAX DEVEL-
OPMENT PROCESS] (describing "critical path" in Fairfax County land development process). The
"critical path" is basically the sequence of approvals a landowner must obtain to commence
construction of a proposed development project.
21. See generally FAIwAx COUNTY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMInISTRATION, FARFAX
CouTY-DEMooR'mc TRtENDs (1986). In 1940, the Fairfax County population was 40,929.
Between 1940 and 1950, the population more than doubled to 98,929. Between 1950 and 1957,
the population again doubled to 207,004. Id.
22. See supra note 12 (listing Virginia Supreme Court decisions involving Board of
Supervisors of Fairfax County); Hazel, supra note 12.
23. See Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 355, 192 S.E.2d
799, 800 (1972); Board of Supervisors v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 359, 193 S.E.2d 1,
2 (1972).
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In Fairfax County, as in other jurisdictions, the first step along this
critical path involves the acquisition of legislative approval for the specific
land use desired. If the land sought to be developed already possesses a
zoning designation that allows the specific land use desired as a matter of
right, i.e., as a "permitted" use, then the landowner does not require any
further legislative approvals. The landowner seeking to establish this "by-
right" use needs only to obtain certain ministerial approvals which, unlike
legislative approvals, do not involve discretionary governmental review. Al-
ternatively, if the land use sought to be established is not allowed by-right,
the landowner must obtain a rezoning of the land to a zoning district which
allows the sought use either as a permitted use or as a "permissible" use
that may be established only upon acquisition of a conditional or special use
permit. If a permissible use is desired, the landowner must obtain the necessary
special use permit approval. With all needed legislative approvals in hand,
the landowner has the right to believe that he has cleared the major hurdles
along the critical path to developing his property. He feels confident that his
development plans are now removed from the legislative arena and that the
only remaining approvals needed for ground-breaking are the nondiscretionary
ministerial approvals. 24 The landowner at this juncture normally begins the
financing of his project and develops investment-backed expectations for
profit and the ultimate success of his development. 2
After obtaining all needed legislative approvals, the landowner moves
forward on his development by obtaining ministerial approvals as needed.
These ministerial approvals include subdivision plan approval, site plan ap-
proval, and finally, building permit issuance. 6 To obtain these ministerial
approvals, the landowner must conform his proposed development to certain
specific and published ordinances and regulations. Although compliance with
these ordinances and regulations is often expensive and time consuming, the
landowner knows that compliance will ensure the issuance of needed minis-
terial approvals. He also knows that mandamus will lie to compel issuance,
if necessary, and that negative public and political opinions, which may have
adversely affected the proposed development in the legislative arena, are now
legally irrelevant.27
24. See 2 FAIRFAX DmEoPMENT PRocass, supra note 20, at 1-109. Depending upon the
type of development proposed, these nondiscretionary ministerial approvals could involve subdi-
vision plan approval, site plan approval, rough grading plan approval, public improvements plan
approval, landscaping plan approval, building permit issuance, residential/non-residential use
permit issuance, and certificate of completion issuance. Id.
25. See Board of Supervisors v. Fralin & Waldron, Inc., 222 Va. 218, 222-23, 278 S.E.2d
859, 861 (1981) (landowner's development of investment-backed expectations after acquisition of
all zoning approvals); Board of Supervisors v. Snell Const. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 658, 202 S.E.2d
889, 893 (1974) (development of investment-backed expectations).
26. See supra note 24.
27. See Board of Supervisors v. Hylton Enters., Inc., 216 Va. 582, 585, 221 S.E.2d 534,
537 (1976) (holding that 'subdivision plan approval is ministerial action and mandamus will lie
to compel approval); Board of Supervisors v. Home, 216 Va. 113, 119, 215 S.E.2d 453, 457
(1975) (holding that approval of site plan and issuance of building permit are ministerial rather
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The issuance of a building permit is normally the final government
approval required prior to the start of construction. 28 Armed with a building
permit, the landowner grades the terrain on his property, constructs needed
infrastructures, such as sanitary sewer lines, public water facilities, and on-
site roads, lays footings and foundations, and finally constructs a building.
In some instances, this preconstruction work is allowed to take place prior
to final issuance of a building permit under a preliminary grading or exca-
vation permit. Following completion of the building and passing of all required
inspections, the landowner obtains a final ministerial approval, namely issu-
ance of a Certificate of Occupancy or other document that legally allows the
sought land use to commence on his land. 29 The proposed land use acquires
increased certainty as the landowner moves through the legislative approval-
ministerial approval-final completion process. At some point in this process,
the landowner obtains a right to complete his project and commence the
specific land use sought regardless of contravening legislative action. In other
words, he acquires a "vested" right. Once a landowner's land development
rights have vested, a legislative attempt to reduce or eliminate these rights
will fail or will require payment of just compensation. 0 The following sections
will attempt to identify this point of vesting under the zoning estoppel and
pure vested rights doctrines.
III. THE DocTRImNs OF ZoNING ESTOPPEL AND PuRE VESTED RIGHTS
Many writers have decided that attempts to distinguish the doctrine of
zoning estoppel from the doctrine of pure vested rights are predestined for
failure or, at best, are purely academic exercises because of the lack of
practical distinctions between the two doctrines.3' These writers make a good
than discretionary acts); Planning Comm'n v. Berman, 211 Va. 774, 776-77, 180 S.E.2d 670,
672 (1971) (holding that site plan approval is ministerial action and mandamus will lie to compel
approval); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-184 (1984) (granting circuit courts authority to issue declaratory
judgments interpreting municipal ordinances); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-475 (1989) (providing that
landowner who wishes to subdivide property may petition circuit court for review of plat of
proposed subdivision and site plans). But see Developer's Rights, supra note 19, at 490 (assertion,
not true in Virginia, that "[d]iscretionary review underlies the subdivision review process").
28. See 3 FAIRFAx DEvELOPMENT PRocEss, supra note 20, at 7-17; SIEMON, supra note 6,
at 26-27; see also Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance §§ 18-600 et seq. (1978) (building permit
regulations).
29. See FAwXAx CoUNTr ZONING ORDINANCE § 18-700, 18-800 (1978) (providing for
Residential and Non-residential Use Permits and Certificates of Completion respectively); 3
FAIRFAX DE ELOPMENT PROCESS, supra note 20, at 111-121 (final ministerial approvals requiring
prior to occupancy).
30. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (infringement upon vested rights requires
just compensation).
31. See MANDELKER, supra note 3, at § 6.12;,SIEMON, supra note 6, at 9; Witt, supra note
11, at 320. Other writers suggest that while the doctrine of pure vested rights and the doctrine
of zoning estoppel are distinguishable on theoretical grounds, courts have chosen to merge the
two doctrines for ease in application. See Rhodes, Hauser & DeMeo, Vested Rights: Establishing
Predictability in a Changing Regulatory System, 13 STETSON L. REv. 1, 2 (1983) [hereinafter
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point in suggesting that whatever distinction that may have existed is now
hopelessly muddled by imprecise judicial application. Nonetheless, we believe
that the underlying theoretical differences between the two doctrines make
for worthy examination in helping the student or practitioner understand the
bifurcated nature of vested rights.12 The doctrine of zoning estoppel protects
property rights by restricting certain exercises of governmental power. The
doctrine of pure vested rights protects property rights by providing the means
by which inchoate land development rights become true constitutional pro-
prietary rights protected by the United States Constitution and certain state
constitutions.
3
Through judicial application, both doctrines have developed sets of
elements that a landowner-plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case
for maintenance of a vested rights claim. Many courts, however, have blurred
the distinction between these two doctrines, often to the point where one is
unable to tell from written opinions which doctrine the court has chosen to
apply.34 Therefore, one should not be surprised to find a strong degree of
similarity between the elements necessary to establish a zoning estoppel claim
and the elements necessary to establish a pure vested rights claim.
Zoning estoppel, like other forms of estoppel, arises out of equity and
is derived from fundamental concepts of justice and fairness."5 The Florida
Rhodes] (Florida courts have merged the two doctrines); Note, When Real Property Rights Vest
in California: What Happens When a Plaintiff Has Not Secured Required Government Ap-
provals?, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 417, 425 (1988) [hereinafter California Vested Rights]
(California courts have merged the two doctrines).
32. See infra 33-51 and accompanying text (exploring underlying theoretical differences
between the two vested rights doctrines); see also Reichenback v. Windward at Southampton, 80
Misc. 2d 1031, 1038-41, 364 N.Y.S.2d 283, 291-94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 48 A.D.2d 909, 372
N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (two vested rights doctrines stand upon distinct and separate
legal foundations).
33. See infra notes 35-51 and accompanying text; see also MANDEIERa, supra note 3, §
6.12; SnION, supra note 6, at 12-13; Heeter, supra note 6, at 65; Rhodes, supra note 31, at 2-
3; Witt, supra note 11, at 319-21; California Vested Rights, supra note 31, at 424-25.
34. See, e.g, District of Columbia v. Cahill, 54 F.2d 453, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (city
"estopped" because landowner had acquired vested rights); Raley v. California Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 977, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 707 (1977) ("vested rights rule"
is simply special expression of general estoppel doctrine"); Marziani v. Lake County Zoning
Board of Appeals, 87 Ill. App. 3d 425, 429, 409 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1980) (estoppel relief granted
in jurisdiction that did not recognize doctrine of equitable estoppel against government). See
generally, SIEMON supra note 6, at 9, 40; Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 9, at 626; Heeter,
supra note 6, at 66 n.5.
35. See P. BucK, MODERN CONTROL OF LAND DEvELoPMENT 261 (1980) [hereinafter BUCK];
Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 9, at 648-49; Heeter, supra note 6 at 64-66; Annotation,
Retroactive Effect of Zoning Regulations, In Absence of Savings Clause, on Validly Issued
Building Permit, 49 A.L.R.3d 13, 26-39 (1973 & Supp. 1988); see also City of Long Beach v.
Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 488-89; 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 42, 467 P.2d 423, 422 (1970); 3 J. POMEROY,
A TREATISE ON EQUrry JURISPRUDENCE §§ 802, 804, 805 (5th ed. 1941). Professor Pomeroy
identified six distinct elements of equitable estoppel. See id. § 804, at 1644-45.
One writer has noted that, although the use of estoppel theories against the government
violates a historical rule that a government cannot be estopped when acting in its governmental
capacity, this rule is a "prerogative fallacy" because it has been riddled with many exceptions.
See Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. Cat. L. Rzv. 680, 683 (1954).
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District Court of Appeal has provided a useful description of this doctrine
with a helpful illustration by stating that "the theory of [zoning] estoppel
amounts to nothing more than an application of the rules of fair play" and
that "[o]ne party will not be permitted to invite another onto a welcome mat
and then be permitted to snatch the mat away to the detriment of the party
induced or permitted to stand thereon. ' 36 While most attempts to provide
definitive restatements of equitable principles have been unsuccessful, Profes-
sor David G. Heeter, in an often-cited 1971 article, 37 provides a concise
definition of the doctrine of zoning estoppel. He writes:
A local government exercising its zoning powers will be estopped
when a property owner,
(1) relying in good faith,
(2) upon some act or omission of the government,
(3) has made such a substantive change in position or incurred such
extensive obligations and expenses that it would be inequitable
and unjust to destroy the rights which he ostensibly had ac-
quired."
Noticeably missing from Professor Heeter's definition is a reference to
the concept of balancing that underlies all equitable standards. Professor
Heeter correctly deleted the concept of balancing from his restatement of the
law because, quite simply, many courts have refrained from such balancing
in considering zoning estoppel cases. 39 Balancing, by its very nature, requires
some judicial intrusion into the legislative process and a weighing of govern-
ment and public prerogatives against private landowning interests. 40 Although
courts have no reluctance in making an intrusion into the legislative process
on constitutional grounds, they understandably are wary of intruding solely
on equitable grounds. 41 In fact, some courts have found the very idea of
36. Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975). See generally Comment, Never Trust a Bureaucrat: Estoppel Against the Government, 42
So. CAL. L. RPv. 391 (1969).
37. Heeter, supra note 6, at 63.
38. Heeter, supra note 6, at 66.
39. See SEMON, supra note 6, at 9; Kudo, Nuckolii: Private Development Rights and the
Public Interest, 16 URa. LAw. 279, 284 (1984); see, e.g., Grayson v. City of Birmingham, 277
Ala. 522, 173 So. 2d 67 (1963); Clairmont Dev. Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255, 149 S.E.2d 489
(1966), overruled by Keenan v. Acher, 226 Ga. 896, 178 S.E.2d 196 (1970); Town of Hillsborough
v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969); Pure Oil Division v. City of Columbia, 254 S.C.
28, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1970). But see Nott v. Wolff, 18 Il1. 2d 362, 367, 163 N.E.2d 809, 812
(1960) (balancing used in Illinois); Tremarco Corp. v. Garzco, 32 N.J. 448, 457, 161 A.2d 241,
245 (1960) (balancing used in New Jersey); Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617
P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1980) (balancing used in Utah).
40. See SmMON, supra note 6, at 38-40; Developers' Rights, supra note 19, at 498-501.
41. See, e.g., Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 300 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1974) (no balancing of public interests with private interests); Town of Hillsborough
v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969) (applying zoning estoppel without balancing);
Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454; 573 P.2d 359 (1978) (balancing of public interest
is avoided); see also SIMoN, supra note 6, at 13 (balancing often is avoided in adjudication of
vested rights cases).
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using equitable estoppel against the government unappealing or, at best, a
harbinger of reversible error.42 This reluctance may explain the muddling of
zoning estoppel with the doctrine of pure vested rights and also may explain
why many courts prefer to use the constitutionally based doctrine of pure
vested rights rather than the equity-based doctrine of zoning estoppel.
The doctrine of pure vested rights stems directly from property protections
contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and from similar provisions found in most state constitutions. 43
These protections provide that property shall not be taken for public purposes
without just compensation."4 Some states, such as the Commonwealth of
Virginia, include in their respective state constitutions the provision that
private property shall not be taken or damaged without payment of just
compensation. 4 The fundamental word in these constitutional passages is
"property". Certain privileges, claims, interests, powers, choses-in-action, or
inchoate rights that do not rise to "property" status are not protected and
may be taken by government action." Development rights must become vested
42. See, e.g., Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 247-51, 506 P.2d 470, 474-78
(1973) (estoppel against government is disfavored); Lewis Cox & Son, Inc. v. High Plains
Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1, 538 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976)
(estoppel against government is unconstitutional); Metro. Park Dist. v. State Dept. of Natural
Resources, 85 Wash. 2d 821, 827, 539 P.2d 854, 858 (1975) (estoppel against government is
disfavored). See generally Annotation, Applicability of Doctrine of Estoppel Against Government
And Its Governmental Agencies, I A.L.R.2d 338 (1948) (Supp. 1988).
43. See U.S. CoNs-r., amends. V, XIV, § 2; VA. CoNsT. art. 11, § 1; see also MAINDELKER,
supra note 3, § 6.12; SmMON, supra note 6, at 58-61; Heeter, supra note 6, at 64-65; see, e.g.,
Billings v. California Coastal Comm'n, 103 Cal. App. 3d 729, 163 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1980);
Department of Transp. v. P.S.C. Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447; 419 A.2d 1151 (1980).
Professor Gray provides the following description of the constitutional base underlying the doctrine
of pure vested rights:
[the term] "vested" has passed from the domain of politics to the law, by reason of
the provisions of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and
in most of the State Constitutions, that no one shall be deprived of his property
"without due process of law," or "but by the law of the land."
GRAY, supra note 5, at 98 n.1.
44. See U.S. CoNsr., amends. V, XIV § 2. The "takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment
was determined to be applicable to the states through the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the very early part of the twentieth century. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 593 (1906). But see N.C. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 17. The North Carolina Constitution is the only state constitution that does not have a "takings"
clause. See id.; Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 1058, n.8.
45. See VA. CONsT. art. 1, § 11; see also A.E. HowARD, CoMIONrAuss ON ThE CONSTn-
TtrTION OF VmGINI 218-225 (1974).
46. See SIEMON, supra note 6, at 48-53, 56-61; Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 9, at
629, 638-41; Delaney & Kominers, supra note 11, at 219-21; see, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (reduction in value of property is not taking of "property"); Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (taking of air rights is
not taking of "property"); In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 592, 546 P.2d 1371,
1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1976) (revocation of license is not taking of "property"); Alcoholic
Resocialization Conditioning Help, Inc. v. State, 206 Neb. 788, 791-92, 295 N.W.2d 281, 284
(1980) (recovation of statutory licenses, permits, or privileges is not taking of "property");
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rights to warrant "property" status.47 Once this process occurs, vested de-
velopment rights are immune from exercises of governmental police power.
These rights still are subject to taking by eminent domain action that must
entail the payment of just compensation by the government to the landowner.
48
The process by which inchoate development rights become vested and
acquire the status of protected property rights is subject to a variety of
judicial definitions and theoretical descriptions. In actual application, however,
the elements involved in this process are almost identical to the elements of
zoning estoppel.49 We believe that the doctrine of pure vested rights could be
summarized as follows:
A landowner obtains a vested right to complete construction on a
specific development project when the landowner
(1) obtains or is the beneficiary of an affirmative governmental act
allowing development of a specific project, and,
(2) relying in good faith upon the affirmative governmental act,
(3) makes a substantial change in position or incurs extensive obli-
gations or expenses in the furtherance of the specific project in
accordance with the affirmative governmental act.5 0
The doctrine of pure vested rights differs on theoretical grounds from
the doctrine of zoning estoppel. But, as a comparison of Professor Heeter's
definition of zoning estoppel with our definition of pure vested rights dem-
onstrates, the prima facie case elements of both doctrines are almost identi-
cal.51 Before we discuss these elements in greater detail, however, we would
like to make two remarks about the proprietary nature of pure vested rights.
First, the doctrine of pure vested rights seemingly implies something that
we believe to be incorrect. The notion of development rights vesting and
becoming property implies that landowners have no basic fundamental rights
Golden Gate Corp. v. Town of Narragansett, 116 R.I. 552, 565-66, 359 A.2d 321, 328 (1976)
(revocation of zoning rights is not taking of "property"). One scholar has noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court's academic movement away from notions of substantive due process that were
prevalent in the early twentieth century has lead to a "demise" in the protection of property
"rights" as constitutionally protected interests. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAnv. L. Ray. 1439 (1968).
47. See Brougher v. Board of Pub. Works, 205 Cal. 426, 434, 271 P. 487, 490-91 (1928);
Southern Leasing Co. v. Ludwig, 168 A.D. 233, 235, 153 N.Y.S. 545, 547 (1915).
48. See Sm'moN, supra note 6, at 53-61; see also ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 30.17;
RAT-KOPF, supra note 3, §§ 6.01-6.60; RoHAN, supra note 3, §§ 52A.01, 52A.02, 52A.03.
49. See MArNDLKaR, supra note 3, § 6.12; SIEmoN, supra note 6, at 12-13; see, e.g.,
District of Columbia v. Cahill, 54 F.2d 453, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (city "estopped" because
landowner had acquired "vested rights"); Allen v. City & County of Honolulu, 58 Haw. 432,
571 P.2d 328, 329 (1977) (elements of both vested rights doctrines are identical).
50. See Billings v. California Coastal Comm'n, 103 Cal. App. 3d 729, 735; 163 Cal. Rptr.
288, 291 (1980); Sgro v. Howarth, 54 Ill. App. 2d 1, 9, 203 N.E.2d 173, 177 (1964); SIEMON,
supra note 6, at 13; Delaney & Kominers, supra note 11, at 222, Witt, supra note 11, at 320.
51. Compare text accompanying supra note 38 with text accompanying supra note 49. the
common elements in both vested rights doctrines are: (1) governmental act (or omission), (2)
good faith, and (3) substantial change in position. See text accompanying supra notes 31-50.
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to develop their properties, i.e., that fee simple ownership of land does not
necessarily include the right to develop land. The doctrine of pure vested
rights suggests that catalysts in the form of the three elements identified
above need to be added to inchoate development rights to give these devel-
opment rights constitutionally protected "property" status. The doctrine also
suggests that, prior to the introduction of these catalysts, a landowners' right
to develop property is an evanescent, inchoate right that may be nullified
without the payment of just compensation by governmental use of police
power. We believe that fee simple ownership of property by its very nature
includes some kind of development right that does not need introduction of
the vesting catalysts to become legally protected property.5 2 Invoking an
illustration known to all first year law students, the proprietary "bundle of
sticks" that a grantee receives with the conveyance of a fee simple interest
in real property contains a true development right "stick." We leave the
definition and identification of this inherent primordial development right for
other scholars. 3
Second, a vested development right cannot exist when the exercise of the
development right qualifies as a nuisance under prevailing law.5 4 The govern-
ment possesses a strong police power to remove or destroy a privately-held
52. See R. PowEsi, TnE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 91-135 (1977); W. RELLY, Tim UsE OF
LAND 140 (1970) [hereinafter REmLy]; TASK FORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN GROWTH, THE
UsE oF LAND 140 (1973); McClaughry, Farmers, Freedom, and Feudalism: How to Avoid the
Coming Serfdom, 21 S.D.L. REv. 486 (1976) [hereinafter McClaughery]. Perhaps the best judicial
proponent of our belief is former Chief Justice Bell of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In
many of his well-reasoned opinions, Chief Justice Bell noted the existence of a common law
right to develop and use land unimpeded by government so long as these activities did not
amount to a public nuisance. See, e.g., Kitmar Builders, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 439
Pa. 466, 478-81, 268 A.2d 765, 771 (1970) (concurring opinion of Bell, C.J.); Exton Quarries,
Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 67, 228 A.2d 169, 182 (1967). Other writers have
criticized the belief that we share with Chief Justice Bell as "the fee simple fable that land can
be used in any way one pleases." See F. BossEUiAN, D. CA=UEs, & J. BANTA, Tan TAKING
IsSUE 318-19 (1973).
In its recent opinion in the case of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825,
107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), the United States Supreme Court recognized the existence of a true land
development right as an incident of fee simple land ownership. The Nollan opinion hopefully
puts an end to arguments given by some local governments that the right to develop land is a
"privilege" and not a true legal or proprietary right. See Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution:
The Supreme Court Establishes New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 Urb. Law. 735,
746-748 (1988) [hereinafter Berger].
53. See generally REILLY, supra note 52, at 140-55; Babcock & Feurer, Land as a Commodity
"Affected with A Public Interest," 52 WASH. L. Rev. 289, 291-99 (1977); Berger, To Regulate
or Not to Regulate-Is That the Question?, 8 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 253, 292-93 (1975); McClaughry,
supra note 52, at 486-96.
54. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593-94 (1962); Clarke v. Haberle
Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384, 386 (1930); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-86 (1928); Hadachek
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 419 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 66-70 (1887); Spur
Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 183-84, 494 P.2d 700, 705-06 (1972);
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 222, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315, 257 N.E.2d 870,
872 (1920); Miller v. State Entomologist, 146 Va. 175, 194, 135 S.E. 813, 818-19 (1926), aff'd,
276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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possession without invoking liability for the payment of just compensation
when that possession poses a direct threat to public health, safety, or welfare.5
In other words, a possession that is a nuisance cannot be "property" under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. When placed in context with our
earlier discussion, these recitations of black letter law pose an interesting
question: Can existing vested property rights lose their vested status by
becoming nuisances? A few courts have answered this question in the affir-
mative by invoking a "new peril" exception to the doctrine of pure vested
rights. 56
IV. TI-M ELEMENTS OF ZONING ESTOPPEL AND PuRE VESTED RIGHTS
A. Governmental Act or Omission
The first and most important element of both vested rights doctrines is
the existence of a governmental act or omission (doctrine of zoning estoppel)
or affirmative governmental act (doctrine of pure vested rights) that allows
a landowner to develop his property. 7 Prior to the advent of sophisticated,
multi-staged land use regulations, a landowner wishing to develop or erect
structures on his land in conformance with applicable zoning regulations only
needed to obtain one governmental approval in the form of a building permit
to commence construction.5 8 Therefore, courts adjudicating vested rights
claims in those early days looked only toward the issuance or nonissuance of
a building permit in determining whether or not the government act element
55. See, e.g., Goldblatt, Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (allowing closure
of quarry declared nuisance without compensation); Clark v. Habefle Brewing Co., 280 U.S.
384, 384 (1930) (allowing destruction of private apple farm infected with Cedar Rust Disease
without compensation); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887) (allowing closure of brewery
deemed "public evil" without compensation); Spur Indus. Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108
Ariz. 178, 183-84, 494 P.2d 700, 705-06 (1972) (allowing closure of cattle feedlot deemed nuisance
without compensation); see also Berger, supra note 52 at 771-72; Stoebuck, supra note 2, at
1059-62.
56. See, e.g., Dade County v. Rosell Construction, 297 So. 2d 46, 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (applying "new peril" exception to doctrine of zoning estoppel); Belle Harbor Realty Corp.
v. Kerr, 35 N.Y.2d 507, 512, 232 N.E.2d 679, 699, 364 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163 (1974) (revocation of
building permits to prevent condition dangerous to public welfare); Ford v. Bellingham-Whatcom
County Dist. Bd. of Health, 16 Wash. App. 709, 711-12, 558 P.2d 821, 824-25 (1977) (questioning
whether vested right can be maintained to imperil health and safety of community); see also
Rhodes, supra note 31 at 17-20 (discussing "new peril" rule); Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 1066-
67 (discussing "emergency doctrine").
57. See MAINDELKE, supra note 3, §§ 6.13, 6.15; SlmmON supra note 6, at 13-29; Delaney
& Kominers; supra note 11, at 226-4; Heeter, supra note 6, at 82-84; Rhodes, supra note 31, at
7-11; Developers' Rights, supra note 19, at 488-94.
58. See SrEMoN, supra note 6, at 13, 26; see, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926); Dainese v. Cooke, 91 U.S. 580 (1975); City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 134
N.Y. 163, 31 N.E. 443 (1892); Wood v. City of Richmond, 148 Va. 400, 138 S.E. 560 (1927).
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's 1927 decision in Village of Euclid, very few
jurisdictions possessed comprehensive zoning ordinances. But see Wood v. City of Richmond,
148 Va. 400, 138 S.E. 560 (1927) (City of Richmond Zoning Ordinance adopted prior to Euclid
decision).
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was satisfied. 9 In other words, the existence of a validly issued building
permit was the principal benchmark of a vested rights claim.
Following World War II, land development became an intensely regulated
process requiring compliance with a host of complex land use regulations and
the issuance of multiple governmental approvals prior to ground-breaking. 60
In the wake of these changes, courts adjudicating vested rights claims began
to develop divergent opinions regarding the nature of the regulatory approval
required to satisfy the governmental act element. 61 The development of this
multiple approval process forced landowners to expend substantial resources
and crystallized their development expectations far in advance of the issuance
of a building permit.62 Thus, the courts determined that fundamental fairness
59. See, e.g., Dainese v. Cooke, 91 U.S. 580 (1875); Tucson v. Arizona Mortuary, 34
Ariz. 495, 272 P. 923 (1928); Brougher v. Board of Public Works, 205 Cal. 426, 271 P. 487
(1928); Brett v. Building Comm'r, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924); Ostronsky v. Newark,
139 A. 911 (N.J. Ch. 1928); City of Dallas V. Meserole, 155 S.W.2d 1019 (rex. Civ. App.)
1941). See also Cunningham & Kramer, supra note 9, at 677-84 (discussing early vested rights
cases); California Vested Rights, supra note 31, at 420-24 (discussing early vested rights rules).
60. See SMIBON, supra note 6, at 13; Cunningham & Kramer, supra note 9, at 696-710;
Hazel, supra note 12; see also Brief for Appellee at 11-14, Board of Supervisors v. Medical
Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d 799 (1972) (No. 7954). A good illustration of the
explosion in regulatory control beyond the building permit may be found in the comparison of
two California vested rights cases. Compare Avco Community Dev. Inc. v. South Coast Regional
Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083
(1977) with Brougher v. Board of Public Works, 205 Cal. 426, 271 P. 487 (1928). In 1928 a
developer desiring to construct a multi-story building in the City of San Francisco only needed to
obtain building permit approval to commence construction. See Brougher, 205 Cal. at 432, 271
P. at 491. In 1976, a developer desiring to construct a residential community in Orange County
needed to obtain (1) a planned unit development (PUD) rezoning approval, (2) preliminary
subdivision approval, (3) final subdivision approval, (4) rough grading plan approval, (5) public
infrastructure and street improvement plan approval, (6) coastal zone development permit approval,
and (7) building permit approval. See Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 789-91, 553 P.2d at 549, 132 Cal.
Rptr. at 389. Interestingly enough, the developer in Avco, after obtaining approvals (I) through
(5) and expending almost three million dollars in obtaining these approvals and performing on-
site work thereunder, was denied a vested right to complete the project simply because a building
permit had not been issued. See Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 793, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
In light of the Avco decision, one understands why two noted practitioners of land use law
stated, "California has always been notorious for being the first jurisdiction to sustain extreme
municipal regulations. Practitioners in other states have joked that a developer should not sue a
California community when it would cost less and save much time if he simply slit his throat."
R. BABcocK & C. SIEMON, Tim ZoNiNa GAmt REvisr 257, 293 (1985).
61. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'n v. Lutz, 314 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (vested rights found in large-scale PUD Rezoning Approval); Lampton v. Pinaire, 610
S.W.2d 915, 921 (Ky. 1980) (vested rights found in final subdivision plan approval); Board of
Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 358, 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1972) (vested
rights found in site plan approval); Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9
Wash. App. 59, 85, 510 P.2d 1140, 1155 (1973) (vested rights found in grading permit approval);
see also supra notes 57-60, infra notes 62-105 and accompany text (discussing governmental acts
sufficient for vesting purposes).
62. See, e.g., Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 789-91, 553 P.2d at 549, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 389 (reporting
that developer expended almost three million dollars in good faith prior to building permit
issuance); City of North Miami v. Margulies, 289 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
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dictates that the determinant governmental approval must be some act per-
formed prior to the issuance of a building permit.63
In spite of the development of this multiple approval process, many
courts have continued to hold that the validly issued building permit remains
as the principal benchmark for satisfaction of the governmental act require-
ment. 4 More enlightened courts, such as the Supreme Court of Virginia,
recognizing that the building permit is no longer the "most vital document
in the development process," 65 have concluded that this principal benchmark
could be approval of site-specific rezoning application, approval of a condi-
tional or special use permit, approval of a subdivision or site plan, approval
of a preliminary permit, or an informal approval given by a public official
66
(1) Zoning Approval
There exists a well-established rule that landowners have no vested rights
to a continuation of the existing zoning of their properties. 67 Some courts,
however, have found that site-specific rezoning approvals, especially those
incorporating specific development plans in the act of legislation, may satisfy
the governmental act requirement. 68 In a modern Planned Unit Development
(reporting that developer expended six hundred thousand dollars in planning and obtaining of
preliminary approvals prior to building permit issue); County Council v. District Land Corp., 337
A.2d 712, 721 (Md. 1975) (reporting that developer expended one million dollars in planning and
obtaining of preliminary approvals prior to building permit issuance); Board of Supervisors v.
Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 357, 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1972) (reporting that developer
spent two hundred forty-seven thousand five hundred dollars in engineering and site planning
prior to building permit issuance).
63. See SIEMON, supra note 6, at 13-29; California Vested Rights, supra note 31, at 428;
see also supra note 61.
64. See MANDELKER, supra note 3, § 6.14; RATHKOPF, supra note 3, Chap. 57, § 1; SMMON,
supra note 6, at 26; see, e.g., Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 789, 553 P.2d at 555, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391;
City of Champaign v. Kroger Co., 88 111. App. 3d 498, 507, 410 N.E.2d 661, 672 (1980); Town
of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 55, 170 S.E.2d 904, 909 (1969); R.A. Vachon & Son,
Inc. v. City of Concord, 112 N.H. 107, 110-11, 289 A.2d 646, 648-49 (1972); Donadio v.
Cunningham, 58 N.J. 308, 317-18, 277 A.2d 375, 382-83 (1971).
65. Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 358, 192 S.E.2d 799,
801 (1972).
66. See infra notes 67-105 and accompanying text. See generally SEnmON, supra note 6, at
13-29.
67. See, e.g., Gillilard v. County of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 3d 610, 613, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 73, 77-78 (1981); Elam v. Albers, 616 P.2d 168, 169 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); City of Fort
Pierce v. Davis, 400 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Golden Gate Corp. v. Town
of Narragansett, 116 R.I. 552, 560, 359 A.2d 321, 328 (1976); City of University Park v. Benner,
485 S.W.2d 773, 778-79 (1972); Town of Vienna v. Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 976, 244 S.E.2d 542,
548 (1978); see also SnmoN, supra note 6, at 14-15. But see Minch v. City of Fargo, 197 N.W.2d
785, 790 (N.D. 1980) (landowner is entitled to rely on existing zoning); cf. Board of Supervisors
v. Fralin & Waldron, Inc., 222 Va. 218, 222-23, 278 S.E.2d 859, 861 (1981) (landowner claiming
vested right in existing zoning classification against board-sponsored downzoning and Virginia
Supreme Court finding downzoning unlawful on other grounds).
68. See, e.g., Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10, 15-18
(Fla. 1976) (vested rights found in rezoning approved with specific development plan); Town of
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(PUD) rezoning, a landowner must commit to develop his property in
accordance with a specifically approved development plan as a condition of
the PUD rezoning approval. 69 Generally, the approved development plan is
the product of close negotiations with government officials and interested
members of the community, normally specifies development densities, building
footprints and an exact site layout, and quite often mandates particular
architectural elevations and landscaping features.70 The development of such
a plan is not inexpensive or routine and often involves the retaining of
sophisticated land planners, engineers, surveyors, and architects. To the
untrained eye, a PUD development plan is often indistinguishable from a site
plan." Given the amount of expenditures in time and money normally
associated with a PUD rezoning and the high degree of specificity inherent
in this type of governmental approval, a landowner will rely on and should
have the right to rely on the PUD rezoning approval, regardless of subsequent
legislative action. Therefore, courts should find that site specific, detailed
Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (vested rights
found in site-specific rezoning); Benson v. City of DeSoto, 212 Kan. 415, 425-26, 510 P.2d 1281,
1288-89 (1973) (zoning estoppel premised upon site-specific rezoning); May Dept. Stores Co. v.
St. Louis County, 607 S.W.2d 857, 870-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (vested rights found in site
specific rezoning); Fasano v. Board of County Conmm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 582, 507 P.2d 23, 30
(1973) (vested rights found in rezoning approved with specific development plan). See generally
SiEMoN, supra note 6; at 15-17.
69. See R. BURcHmLL & J. HuoHEs, PLAND UNIT DEvELoPmENT: NEw Commuorrms,
AMERicAN STYLE 24, 34-38 (1972); D. MMADELKER & R. CummINGHAM, PLANNINo AND CONTROL
OF LAND D vLEoP)mEN 655-674 (1979); Cumminghan & Kremer, supra note 9, at 644-48;
Developers' Rights, supra note 19, at 491-94; see also, Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance (1978),
as amended, §§ 6-101 through 6-310 (Planned Unit Development regulations for PDH, PDC,
and PRC zoning districts); FREDERICKSBURG VA. CODE (1987) §§ 17.2-10.1 through 15.1 (Planned
Unit Development regulations for PDR and PDC zoning districts); HERNDON VA. CODE Articles
12 & 15A (1977) (Planned Unit Development regulations for PDH and PMU zoning districts).
70. See, e.g., FAIRFAx CooTrrY, VA. ZoING ORDINANcE § 16-502 (1978) (mandatory
submission requirements for Final Development Plan). A landowner seeking to develop property
under one of the Fairfax County PUD zoning districts must file a Conceptual Development Plan
(CDP) simultaneously with a PUD Rezoning Application, obtain rezoning and CDP approval,
and then file and obtain approval of a Final Development Plan (FDP) prior to engaging in the
ministerial subdivision plan or site plan approval process. See id. at §§ 6-101 through 6-310
(PDH, PDC, and PRC rezoning approval process). A FDP must show in detail the following
elements as minimum submission requirements:
(1) boundary survey with complete metes and bounds closure,
(2) location and arrangement of all proposed uses,
(3) height, footprint, and description of all purposed structures,
(4) parking layout,
(5) landscaping and transitional screening measures,
(6) architectural sketches,
(7) plan for utility installation,
(8) storm drainage plan and delineation of all floodplain areas,
(9) notes and tabulations with complete data regarding overall density, square footage,
parking, and open space.
See id. at § 16-502.
71. See id.
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rezoning approvals, especially those involving PUDs, satisfy the governmental
act requirement.
Another kind of rezoning approval that should satisfy the governmental
act requirement is one legislated concurrent with the acceptance of certain
proffered conditions (proffers).72 This kind of rezoning approval, known in
Virginia as "conditional zoning," allows a local governing body to accept
written proffers, voluntarily tendered by a landowner or zoning applicant
prior to rezoning action, and to grant a rezoning to a certain zoning district
with zoning district regulations as specifically amended by the proffers. 73
Once accepted, proffers become part of the zoning district regulations as
those regulations apply to the specific property involved in the rezoning. 74
Although proffers are voluntarily offered, they are also the product of close
negotiations with government officials and interested members of the com-
munity. Without an offering of proffers that address issues raised by govern-
ment officials, the rezoning application undoubtedly will face problems during
the legislative process. 75 The acceptance of proffers by a governing body
concurrent with a rezoning approval generally is not considered to give rise
to contractual duties or obligations on the part of the governing body.
However, such action clearly evidences the completion of a mutually beneficial
negotiation process between the public and private section. Thus, a conditional
rezoning approval should satisfy the governmental act requirement.
(2) Conditional or Special Use Permit Approval
As discussed above, a requested land use may be one that, although not
allowed as a by-right permitted use, is allowed as a permissible use upon the
72. See ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 9.20 (conditional zoning); MANDELKER, supra note 3,
§§ 6.60-6.63 (conditional zoning); RATmoPF, supra note 3, §§ 27.44-27.54 (conditional zoning);
Ro N, supra note 3, §§ 5.01-5.04 (conditional zoning).
73. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-491(a), 15.1-491.1 et seq., (1989) (conditional zoning
statutes); FAnFAx CouNTY, VA. ZoNNo ORDNANcE § 18-204 (1978) (Fairfax County conditional
zoning ordinance). Conditional zoning allows for an applicant to design a rezoning proposal in
order to address site specific issues and concerns raised by planning staff, elected officials, and
interested citizens. See J. Foote, Planning and Zoning in Virginia 8-10 (1988) [hereinafter Foote]
(unpublished manuscript available at Washington & Lee University Law Review Office). As the
former County Attorney of Prince William County, Virginia noted, "[c]onditional zoning remains
an excellent tool for minimizing the impact of [rezoning] proposals." Id. at 9. See generally
Brown & Shilling, Conditional Zoning in Virginia, 16 U. RIcH. L. REv. 117 (1981).
74. See Foote, supra note 73, at 9.
75. See id. at 8-9. As the former County Attorney of Prince William County, Virginia
accurately stated, conditional rezoning proffers "permit applicants to tailor proposals to meet
site-specific needs that cannot otherwise be addressed and to meet objections that may doom the
project and send the parties into years of litigation and delay." Id. at 8-9. While the Code of
Virginia provides that the submission of conditional zoning proffers is entirely "voluntary," the
passage quoted above provides some indication of the "voluntary" nature involved. A conditional
rezoning applicant may "voluntarily" submit written proffers to address issues raised by a
rezoning application or may "voluntarily" choose to have the application denied because of
outstanding issues. Perhaps in determining whether or not proffers are truly voluntary, Virginia
courts should consider the advice of Justice Holmes: "[11n states bound together by a Constitution
and subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, great caution should be used not to let fiction deny
the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact." McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
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granting of a conditional or special use permit. 6 The granting of this permit
is a legislative act that in many respects is strikingly similar to the granting
of a site specific rezoning application. 77 In many jurisdictions, a landowner
seeking the conditional or special use permit must submit a development plan
depicting in detail the proposed use and site layout and must agree to conduct
the permissible use only in accordance with the development plan .7  Addi-
tionally, many jurisdictions, including Virginia, allow the governmental body
granting the permit to impose development conditions specifying, often in
great detail, the manner in which the landowner must conduct the permissible
use.
79
The issuance of a conditional or special use permit indicates the govern-
ment's approval of a particular use as restricted by the development plan and
development conditions. A landowner undoubtedly will rely upon this ap-
proval, expend funds, and move forward in obtaining any ministerial ap-
provals required for the commencement of construction. 0 Therefore, issuance
76. See, e.g., FAIRFAx COUNTY VA., ZONING ORDINANCE (1978) § 3-103 (1978) (church
allowed in R-I (residential-one dwelling unit per acre) zoning district upon granting of special
use permit); id. § 4-804 (fast food restaurants allowed in C-8 (commercial-highway corridor)-
zoning district upon granting of special exception permit); LoUDouN COUNTY, VA. ZONING
ORDINANCE § 760.4.2 (1972) (extractive industries and quarries allowed in A-3 (agricultural-one
dwelling unit every three acres) zoning district). See generally MANDELKER, supra note 3, at §§
6.49-6.57 (conditional or special use permits discussed); RATHKOPF, supra note 3, at § 41.01
(conditional use permit authorizations).
77. See, e.g., Cohn v. County Board of Supervisors, 135 Cal. App. 2d 180, 184, 186 P.2d
836, 838 (1955) (special use permits, like zoning, run with land); Board of Supervisors v.
Southland Corp., 224 Va. 514, 522-23, 297 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1978) (special permit granted to
quickservice foodstore). See generally MANDELKER, supra note 3, §§ 6.49-6.53; RATHKOPF, supra
note 3, §§ 41.01-41.92; Rohan, supra note 3, at §§ 44.01-44.05.
In Falrfax County, conditional use permit authorizations come in two forms: special
exceptions, granted by the Board of Supervisors, and special permits, granted by the Board of
Zoning Appeals. See FAIRFAx COUNTY, VA. ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 8-001 through 8-909 (1978)
(special permits); see also FAIRFAX DvELopmENT PROCESS, supra note 20 at 93-131; Foote, supra
note 73 at 23-26.
78. See, e.g., FAwRAX CoUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE § 9-011 (1978) (development plan
submission requirement for special exceptions); id. § 8-011 (development plan submission require-
ment for special permits); LourDouN CotrTY, VA. ZONING ORDINANCE § 1211-1212 (1972)
(development plan submission requirement for special exceptions).
79. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-496 (1989) (authorization for local governing bodies to
impose development conditions); id. § 15.1-495 (authorization for boards of zoning appeals to
impose development conditions); FAIRFAX Coutry, VA. ZO NIG ORDINANCE §§ 8-007, 9-007
(1978) (imposition of development conditions on special exception and special permit approvals);
LouDouN CoUNT-Y, VA. ZONING ORDINANCE § 1211.6 (1972) (development conditions). See
generally Foote, supra note 73, at 24-26.
80. See, e.g., Renieris v. Villiage of Skokie, 85 Il. 2d 418, 422-23 229 N.E.2d 345, 348-
49 (1967) (reporting that holder of motel special permit made expenditures in reliance upon
special permit); Pure Oil Div. v. City of Columbia, 254 S.C. 28, 32, 173 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1970)
(reporting that service station permit holder made reliance expenditures); Board of Supervisors
v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 358, 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1972) (reporting that holder
of nursing home special permit expended $247,500 in reliance upon approved special permit);
Board of Supervisors v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 362, 193 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1972) (reporting
that holder of service station special permit made expenditures in reliance upon approved special
permit).
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of a conditional or special use permit also should satisfy the governmental
act requirement.
In the Commonwealth of Virginia, a landowner upon acquisition of
requisite rezoning or special use permit approvals is no longer subject to the
legislative discretion by which local government can exercise its discretionary
powers on the proposed development. For legal and practical reasons, achiev-
ing freedom from government discretion is the most important hurdle. Legally,
the Virginia landowner now possesses the right to compel issuance of the
remaining ministerial approvals required for ground-breaking by writ of
mandamus.8' The granting of the rezoning application or special use permit
is the last discretionary act by government required for development. Many
courts have placed great weight on the granting of this last discretionary act
in determining vested rights claims.Y Practically, the Virginia landowner,
cognizant that his proposed project is subject only to ministerial approvals,
commences substantial reliance expenditures and develops investment-backed
expectations after obtaining this last discretionary act approval." In other
jurisdictions where approval of a rezoning or special use permit is not the
last discretionary government act, i.e., where the subdivision plan, site plan,
or building permit processes involve legislative review,84 a landowner has not
cleared the most important hurdle and should not commence substantial
reliance expenditures.
As previously mentioned, a landowner in Virginia has no right to rely
on a continuation of permitted by-right land uses allowed under existing
zoning,85 unless that existing zoning is the product of a PUD or conditional
81. See Board of Supervisors v. Hylton Enters., 216 Va. 582, 585, 221 S.E.2d 534, 537
(1976) (subdivision plan approval is ministerial action and mandamus will lie to compel approval);
Board of Supervisors v. Home, 216 Va. 113, 119, 215 S.E.2d 453, 457 (1975) (site plan approval
and building permit issuance are ministerial rather than discretionary acts); Planning Comm'n v.
Berman, 211 Va. 774, 776-77, 180 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1971) (site plan approval is ministerial action
and mandamus will lie to compel approval); May v. Whitlow, 201 Va. 533, 537, 111 S.E.2d
804, 807 (1960) (mandamus will lie to compel performance of ministerial duty by local officials);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-644 (1984) (writ of mandamus allowed to compel ministerial action); id.
§ 15.1-475 (1989) (circuit court may review decision of Planning Commission regarding subdivision
plan).
82. See, e.g., Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Constr. Comm'n, 48 Cal. App.
3d 534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975) (applying last discretionary act test); Kauai County v. Pacific
Standard Life Ins. Co., 65 Haw. 318, 653 P.2d 766 (1982) (final discretionary action test applied).
See generally, SIEoN, supra note 6, at 701-04; Rhodes, supra note 31, at 8 n.44.
83. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 358, 192
S.E.2d 799, 801 (1972); Board of Supervisors v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 362, 193
S.E.2d 1, 3 (1972). The United States Supreme Court apparently has adopted a constitutionally
mandated vested rights standard that protects investment-backed expectations. See Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n
v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See generally SIEMON,
supra note 6, at 62-64; Berger, supra note 52, at 765-70.
84. See Developers' Rights, supra note 19, at 490 (alleging, with supportive citations, that
subdivision process in some states, unlike Virginia, involves discretionary review).
85. See Town of Vienna Council v. Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 976, 244 S.E.2d 542, 548 (1978).
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zoning approval 6 The landowner does have a right, however, to rely on a
continuation of permissible conditional land uses allowed under a special use
permit.Y7 Because permitted land uses are deemed always appropriate in a
specific zoning district and because permissible land uses are deemed only
sometimes appropriate in that zoning district, a counterintuitive situation
appears to exist with regard to vesting; the "sometimes appropriate" land
use is vested while the "always appropriate" land use is not. A logical
explanation, however, does exist.
Although the landowner seeking the "sometimes appropriate" permissible
use has fulfilled the governmental act element by obtaining a special use
permit, his sought land use will not receive vested status until the other two
elements of a vested rights claim are met.88 To vest his "sometimes appro-
priate" permissible land use, the Virginia landowner must expend substantial
resources and file a bona fide subdivision plan or site plan in good faith.89
The landowner seeking the "always appropriate" permitted use must take
the same steps and, by doing so, places his sought land use on par with the
special permit use already worthy of reliance. 9° In other words, permissible
86. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (discussing PUD and conditional zoning
approvals).
87. See Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. at 358, 192 S.E.2d 799,
801 (1972); Board of Supervisors v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 362, 193 S.E.2d 1, 3;
notes 76-80 and accompanying text (governmental act requirement satisfied by special use permit
approval).
88. See infra notes 106-112 and accompanying text. Besides showing a governmental act
or omission, a landowner seeking a vested rights status must demonstrate good faith reliance
and a substantial change in position. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 38 and 50
(elements of two vested rights doctrines).
89. See Medical Structures, 213 Va. at 358, 192 S.E.2d at 801, Cities Service, 213 Va. at
362, 193 S.E.2d at 3.
90. See Dominion Lands, Inc. v. City of Alexandria, Chancery No. 18,106 (Alex. Circuit
Ct. Feb. 1, 1988). In Dominion Lands, the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria considered
the case of a landowner who filed a bona fide site plan showing a permitted by-right commercial
development, acted in good faith, and expended substantial resources in seeking site plan approval,
After filing and consideration of the site plan by the Alexandria Planning Commission, the
Planning Commission deferred decision on the site plan in order to allow the Alexandria City
Council to propose a zoning ordinance amendment that would reduce the permitted height of
buildings on the landowner's property below the height proposed in the site plan. See Motion
for Declaratory Judgment at 1-4, Dominion Lands (No. 18,106).
While the proposed zoning ordinance amendment was pending staff review, the Planning
Commission approved the site plan. One week later, the City Council enacted the zoning
ordinance amendment without providing any grandfathered rights and immediately thereafter
several citizens appealed the site plan approval, claiming that the recently enacted height limitation
should apply. After the City Attorney advised the City Council to apply the recently enacted
height limitation when considering the appeal, the landowner, Dominion Lands, Inc., filed for
declaratory judgment seeking a declaration of vested rights in the approved site plan. See id.
The Circuit Court granted the relief requested and determined that, under the Medical Structures!
Cities Service test, the landowner was entitled to vested rights in the approved site plan. See
Dominion Lands (No. 18,106).
Dominion Lands stands clearly for the proposition that a landowner seeking to develop an
"always appropriate," permitted by-right land use, which does not require any kind of special
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land uses and permitted land uses deserve the same degree of vesting protection
upon the filing of a bona fide subdivision plat or site plan. 91
(3) Subdivision Plat or Site Plan Approvals
In Virginia, the filing of a subdivision plat or site plan "creates a
monument to the developer's" intentions.92 This monument is, in essence,
the physical incarnation of substantial reliance expenditures by the landowner.
A Virginia landowner who expends substantial resources in preparing and
filing a bona fide subdivision plan or site plan in good faith reliance upon
existing zoning obtains a vested right to the land use sought therein. 93 The
subsequent approval of the subdivision plan or site plan bolsters the Virginia
landowner's vested rights assertion, but is not required for vested rights to
arise in the sought land use.
In some states that do not follow the Virginia "vesting upon filing" rule,
approval of a subdivision plan or site plan will suffice as the requisite
government act for vesting purposes."4 A few courts in other states appreciate
the harshness of requiring a validly issued building permit for satisfaction of
the governmental act requirement, but do not believe that subdivision plat or
site plan approvals are sufficient governmental acts. These courts apply a
"probability of issuance" standard.95 Under this standard, the governmental
act element is satisfied when a landowner substantially changes his position
in reliance upon the probability of building permit issuance. 6 Because issuance
use permit approval, may obtain a vested rights status if the critical elements in the Medical
Structures/Cities Service test are met.
91. See supra note 90.
92. Medical Structures, 213 Va. at 358, 192 S.E.2d at 801.
93. See id. at 358, 192 S.E.2d at 801; Cities Service at 362, 193 S.E.2d at 3.
94. See, e.g., Wilcox Assoc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 603 P.2d 903, 905 (Alaska
1979); Kasparek v. Johnson County Bd. of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Iowa 1980); Lampton
v. Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915, 921 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Ward v. City of New Rochelle, 8 N.Y.2d
895, 204 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1960); Northbury Estates, Inc. v. Long Island Lighting Co., 47 Misc.
2d 134, 139, 261 N.Y.S.2d 773, 776 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963); see also SisMON, supra note 6, at 24-
26. But see Dawe v. City of Scottsdale, 119 Ariz. 486, 489, 581 P.2d 1136, 1138 (1978) (no
vested rights from subdivision plat approval); Vachon & Son, Inc. v. City of Concord, 112 N.H.
103, 106, 289 A.2d 646, 649 (1972) (no protection from new zoning enactments through approved
subdivision plan).
95. See, e.g., Baker v. County of Forsyth, 248, Ga. 73, 77 281 S.E.2d 549, 552 (1981);
Life of the Land, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu, 60 Haw. 446, 592 P.2d 26, 28-29
(1979); Dening v. County of Maui, 52 Haw. 653, 485 P.2d 1048, 1051-52 (1971); Cos Corporation
v. City of Evanston, 17 IlL. 2d 570, 576-77, 190 N.E.2d 364, 367-68 (1963). See generally SEMON,
supra note 6, at 26-27.
96. See, e.g., Life of the Land, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu, 61 Haw. 390, 459-
62, 606 P.2d 866, 902-03 (1980); Mattson v. City of Chicago, 89 Ill. App. 378, 381-82, 411
N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (1980). In Mattson, the Illinois Court of Appeals considered the case of a
landowner who had expended $1,600.00 to demolish a building valued at $40,000.00 in order to
build a new structure on the same land. Mattson, 89 Ill. App. at 381, 44 N.E.2d at 1005. The
court found that the landowner had acted in good faith "in reliance upon the probability of the
forthcoming [building] permit." Id. at 381, 44 N.E.2d at 1005. In Life of the Land, the Hawaii
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of a building permit is a purely ministerial act,91 we find this "probability of
issuance" standard an illusory substitute for the governmental act requirement
and believe that courts applying this standard really find the governmental
act requirement satisfied by some earlier, yet undisclosed, approval.
(4) Preliminary Permit Approvals
In many jurisdictions, landowners are authorized to commence certain
development activities prior to approval of a building permit upon acquisition
of one or more preliminary permits. 8 Included in this array of permits are
rough grading permits, clearing permits, paving permits, foundation permits,
and public improvement permits. 99 Some jurisdictions will allow issuance of
these preliminary permits prior to subdivision plan or site plan approval.100
Approval of many preliminary permits, issued before site plan, subdivision
plan, or building permit approval, will cause landowners to expand substantial
resources and develop investment-backed expectations in good faith.10' As use
of these preliminary permit approvals increase to allow for construction prior
to site plan, subdivision plan, or building permit approval, cases finding
Supreme Court held that, because the landowner had expended substantial resources in designing
a project in good faith and because the proposed project was in complete conformance with all
zoning requirements, the local building department had no discretion to deny issuance of a
building permit. Life of the Land, 61 Haw. at 459-62, 606 P.2d at 902-03.
97. See, e.g., Palmer v. Fox, 119 Cal. App. 2d 453, 457, 258 P.2d 30, 33 (1958); Board
of Supervisors v. Home, 216 Va. 113, 119, 215 S.E. 453, 457 (1975); Planning Commission v.
Berman, 211 Va. 774, 776-77, 180 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1971); see also SiniON, supra note 6, at 26;
Developers' Rights, supra note 19, at 489.
98. See, e.g., Avco Community Dev., Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d
785, 790-91, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389, 553 P.2d 546, 549 (1976) (public improvement plans and
permits, allowing construction of storm drains, sewer systems, and public roads approved prior
to issuance of building permit, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977); Sakolsky v. City of Coral
Gables, 151 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1963) (foundation permit approved allowing below-grade
construction prior to issuance of building permit); Emerald Home Builders, Inc. v. Kolton, 11
Ill. App. 3d 888, 892-94, 198 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1973) (excavation and footing permits approved
prior to building permit issuance); Hill Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Passaic, 156 N.J. Super.
505, 508-09, 384 A.2d 172, (1978) (excavation permit approved prior to issuance of building
permit); Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wash. App. 59, 61-62,
510 P.2d 1140, 1142 (1973) (grading permit, allowing site clearing and grading, approved prior
to issuance of building permit); see also FAwRFx Da LmoPmrr PRocEss, supra note 20, at 1-
109; SIaMoN, supra note 6, at 19-24; Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 9, at 704-10.
99. See supra note 98 (citing cases from jurisdictions that allow development activities after
issuance of preliminary permits).
100. See supra note 98 (citing cases from jurisdictions that allow development activities after
issuance of preliminary permits).
101. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d
785, 800-01, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 395-95, 553 P.2d 546, 555-56 (1976); SmmION, supra note 6, at
20-21; Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 9, at 704-08; California Vested Rights, supra note 31,
at 427-28. The Avco case demonstrates the fundamental unfairness of the government allowing
a large scale development to move forward without vested rights status after the landowner
receives approval of many preliminary permits and makes many substantial reliance expenditures.
See also supra note 62 (discussing Avco decision).
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satisfaction of the governmental act requirement premised upon preliminary
permit approval are bound to arise.
(5) Informal Approvals
Prior to and during the land development regulatory review and approval
process, informal interactions between landowners and government officials
occur on a frequent basis.lec On many occasions, government officials will
give advice on development options, make affirmative representations of law
or fact, or issue oral or written opinions. 103 Although a sophisticated land-
owner surely would not expend substantial resources toward a development
project relying solely upon one or more of these informal actions, less
experienced landowners may, in good faith, rely on the word of a government
official and proceed accordingly.104 While a few interesting cases exist in
which courts have found satisfaction of the governmental act requirement
based solely upon informal approvals, most courts would not find such
approvals to be governmental acts sufficient for vesting purposes. 05
B. Good Faith
The second element of both vested rights doctrines is the requirement
that the landowner act in good faith when relying upon a governmental act106
Good faith in the context of a vested rights claim means that the landowner
proceeds with his proposed development plans in accordance with a govern-
102. See SIEmoN, supra note 6, at 17.
103. See, e.g., Goto v. District of Columbia Bd. of Adjustment, 423 A.2d 917, 925 (D.C.
Ct. App 1980); Project Home, Inc. v. Town of Astatula, 373 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. Dist Ct.
App. 1979); Konicki v. Village of Hinsdale, 100 Ill. App. 3d 560, 562, 427 N.E.2d 325, 327
(1981).
104. See Project Home, Inc. v. Town of Astatula, 373 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979). In Project Home, the Town Council of Astatula, Florida directed the Town Clerk to
respond favorably to a landowner's request to use his property for mobile home purposes.
Following Town Clerk's response, the landowner drafted a sketch plan showing a six-lot mobile
home development and asked if the proposed land use was permitted. Again, the Town Clerk
advised the landowner that the proposed use was acceptable. Acting upon this assurance, the
landowner, the landowner entered into a contract of sale with a Jesuit priest who desired to
provide low income housing to the community. The sale was contingent upon the Town approving
a ten-lot mobile home development. The Town Clerk not only advised that the ten-lot development
was permitted, but actually assisted the priest in drafting a new sketch plan. Id. at 712-13. The
priest purchased the property and again sought the advice of the Town Clerk who advised that
water and sewer permits would be issued for the project as a "matter of routine." Prior to
development, however, the Town Council downzoned the priest's property to a new zoning
district that allowed only two mobile homes on the site. The priest sought judicial relief. The
Florida Court held that the priest's project was vested and that the governmental act requirement
was satisfied by the Town Clerk's affirmative assurances. Id. at 713. See generally Comment,
Never Trust a Bureaucrat: Estoppel Against The Government, 42 S. CAL. L. Rav. 391 (1969).
105. See supra note 103.
106. See supra notes 38, 50 and accompanying text; see also MANE UM R, supra note 3,
§6.17; RATHKOPF, supra note 3, §§50.03-50.04; SmMoN, supra note 6, at 29-32; Heeter, supra
note 6, at 77-82; Rhodes, supra note 31, at 4-7.
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ment approval without knowledge of a pending change in the zoning ordi-
nance. 7 One obvious problem in determining whether the landowner acted
in good faith arises due to the varied manner in which zoning ordinance
amendments become "pending."Ies Some zoning ordinance amendments begin
as official resolutions adopted by elected officials. Others may arise from
citizens' task forces, comprehensive plan revision, political speeches, internal
memoranda prepared by staff, or by referendum. In one of the leading cases
involving this "pending ordinance" question, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
determined that a zoning ordinance amendment was "pending" when a public
hearing before the zoning board had been duly advertised and a printed
version of the proposed ordinance was available for public inspection.'09
Another problem in determining good faith arises due to nonuniformities in
the dissemination of information concerning pending ordinance changes; some
landowners always will learn of pending zoning ordinance changes before
others do, and some landowners never learn of the changes prior to actual
enactment."10
In light of the difficulty in applying a subjective test for good faith,
most courts appear to apply an objective standard. The courts determine
whether a reasonable landowner would have acted in the same manner as
107. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Arizona Mortuary, 34 Ariz. 495, 504-06, 272 P. 923, 928
(1928); Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. 1955); Sakolsky v. City of Coral
Gables, 151 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1953); Von Bokel v. City of Breese, 100 Ill. App. 3d 956, 960
427 N.E.2d 322, 325 (1981); Kasparek v. Johnson County Bd. of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511, 518-
19 (Iowa 1980); Murrell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842, 851 (Mo. 1966); Sautto v. Edenton Apartments,
84 N.J. Super. 461, 469-72 202 A.2d 466, 472-73 (1964); Bosse v. City of Portsmouth, 107 N.H.
523, 531-32, 226 A.2d 99, 106-07 (1967); Miller v. Dassler, 155 N.Y.S.2d 975, 979 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1956); Application of Campsites Unlimited, 287 N.C. 493, 215 S.E.2d 73, 79 (1975); Clackamas
County v. Holmes, 265 Or. 193, 196-97, 508 P.2d 190, 192-93 (1973); Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa.
223, 226, 157 A.2d 368, 369 (1960); Glazer v. Zoning Board of Worcester Township, 423 A.2d
463, 465 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980); Sherman v. Reavis, 273 S.C. 342, 543, 257 S.E.2d 735, 737
(1979); Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1980); Board of Supervisors v.
Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1972). See generally SIEMoN, supra
note 6, at 29-32; Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 9, at 718-22; Annotation, Retroactive Effect
of Zoning Regulation, in Absence of Savings Clause, on Validly Issued Building Permit, 49
A.L.R.3d 43-52 (1973).
108. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Clearwater, 383 So. 2d 681, 688-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (zoning ordinance amendment is "pending" when active and documented efforts by planning
staff to amend zoning ordinance are known to local governing body); Kasparek v. Johnson
County Bd. of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511, 517-19 (Iowa 1980) (zoning ordinance is not "pending"
until official enactment by local governing body); Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445 Pa. 327, 331-
32, 284 A.2d 744, 747-48 (1971) (zoning ordinance amendment is pending, regarless of landowner's
knowledge, when planning staff are authorized to begin work on new amendment); See also
Developer's Rights, supra note 19, at 503-05 ("pending ordinance rule"); Annotation, Retroactive
Effect of Zoning Regulation, in Absence of Savings Clause, on Pending Application for Building
Permit, 50 A.L.R.3d 596, 620-32 (1973) (cases discussing when zoning ordinance amendment
becomes "pending") [hereinafter Pending Ordinance Rule Annotation].
109. See Baron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445 Pa. 327, 331-32, 284 A.2d 744, 747-48 (1971);
SIEMON, supra note 6, at 30.
110. See Sm soN, supra note 6, at 330-32; Heeter, supra note 6 ?it 77-82; Pending Ordinance
Rule Annotation, supra note 108, at 620-32.
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the landowner whose good faith is at issue."' The potential number of factual
situations involving application of this objective standard is infinite and a
case-by-case determination of good faith is warranted. A review of the factual
situations and respective holdings presented in published opinions may prove
of assistance to the practitioner or, at the least, will provide interesting
reading.'
2
C. Substantial Change in Position
The third and final element of both vested rights doctrines is the require-
ment that the landowner make a substantial change in position or incur
extensive obligations or expenses in furtherance of his development project."'
This element is quite similar to "detrimental reliance" as that term is used
in traditional estoppel theories." 4 The substantial change in position element
involves expenditures of money, the irrevocable commitment of resources,
and the acceptance of liabilities in reliance upon the government act."' The
111. See supra note 108 (citing cases in which courts applied objective standard); see also
M"ADLKcR, supra note 3, at 218; Heeter, supra note 6, at 78-82. One writer has provided a
persuasive argument in favor of an objective standard for determining good faith. See California
Vested Rights, supra note 31, at 436-38.
112. See supra note 107 (citing vested rights "good faith" cases). In Virginia an interesting
memorandum opinion exists in which the Circuit Court of Fauguier County determined that a
landowner's attempt to obtain a vested rights status under the Medical Structures-Cities Service
test failed for want of good faith. See Costello v. Board of Supervisors, Chancery No. 83-62
(Fauquier County Circuit Ct. June 22, 1983). In Costello, a landowner submitted a site plan for
a permitted by-right commercial development in the wake of a well-publicized downzoning of
several tracts, including the landowner's property. The landowner's representative stated before
the Planning Commission considering the site plan that the landowner "isn't too interested in
developing that thing right now, but she'd do it because we have to; we don't have any choice
and you put us to the wall .. " Id. The Circuit Court held that the filing of the site plan was
an "ineffectual attempt to acquire a vested right in either the preexisting commercial zoning of
the parcel, or in the consideration of the plan in accordance with commercial zoning in effect
at the time of the filing of the plan with the County." Id.
113. See supra notes 38, 50 and accompanying text; see also MANDEUCER, supra note 3,
§§6.18-6.20; RATrmcoPF, supra note 3, §50.03; SiEMON, supra note 6, at 32-38; Delaney &
Kominers, supra note 11, at 222-41; Heeter, supra note 6, at 84-90; Rhodes, supra note 31, at
11-13.
114. See J. PommRoY, A TkIarsn ON EQUTrrY Jt sPRuDENcE, § 805 (5th ed. 1941). According
to Professor Pomeroy, the equitable estoppel element termed "detrimental reliance" involves a
"change in [one's] position for the worse; in other words [one] must act so that he would suffer
a loss if he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter what he has done by reason of
[another] party being permitted to repudiate his conduct and to assert rights inconsistent with
it." Id.
115. See, e.g., Phoenix City Council v. Canyon Ford, Inc., 12 Ariz. App. 595, 473 P.2d
797 (1970); Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d
534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975); Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975); City of Hollywood v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co., 283 So. 2d 867 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1973); rev'd in part, 329 So. 2d 10 (1976); Brennan v. Board of Zoning
Adjustments, 371 So. 2d 324 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Sautto v. Edenboro Apartments, Inc., 84
N.J. Super. 451, 101 A.2d 466 (1964); Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d
904 (1969); Pure Oil Div. v. City of Columbia, 254 S.C. 28, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1973); Board of
Supervisors v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 1 (1972). See generally SmmoN,
supra note 6, at 32-38; Heeter, supra note 6, at 84-90.
LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT
term "substantial" possesses quantitative, qualitative, and relative character-
istics. The expenditure must be of a monetary amount that indicates a bona
fide commitment to move forward with the project, must be dedicated toward
acquisition of those required goods and services that move the project closer
to completion, and must bear a reasonable relationship to total project cost." 6
Expenses that would not be truly wasted if vested rights were found not
to exist would probably not suffice as detrimental reliance expenditures."17
Therefore, land acquisition expenses would not suffice unless the actual cost
included some form of premium price representing the value of a transferable
special use permit or zoning development right that would be lost if vested
116. See MA"DEL=R, supra note 3, §6.19; SIEMON, supra note 6, at 32-38; Heeter, supra
note 6, at 85-90. Some courts determine whether or not substantial reliance is present by applying
a quantitative or "set quantum" test. Under this test, a court gauges a landowner's substantial
reliance by the amount of material and cash expended. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v.
Lutz, 314 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) ($100,000 in expenditures justifies vested rights
status); City of Ft. Pierce v. Davis, 400 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ($4,000 in
expenditures does not justify vested rights status); Bregar v. Britton, 75 So. 2d 733 (Fla. Dist
Ct. App. 1954) ($28,000 in expenditures justifies vested rights status); State ex rel Great Lakes
Pipe Line Co. v. Hendrickson, 393 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1965) ($64,000 in expenditures justifies
vested rights status); Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d
799 (1972) ($247,000 in expenditures justifies vested rights status).
Other courts determine whether or not substantial reliance is present by applying a qualitative
test. Under this test, a court gauges a landowner's substantial reliance by the type of the
expenditures made. See, e.g., Graham Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 1, 97 A.2d
564 (1953) (costs associated with excavation and pouring of footings do not suffice as substantial
reliance expenditures). Petty v. Barrentine, 594 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (contractural
obligations, including construction loan, suffice as substantial reliance expenditures); County
Council v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 337 A.2d 712 (1975) (land acquisition costs do
not suffice as substantial reliance expenditures); May Dep't Stores Co., v. County of St. Louis,
607 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (land acquisition cost that includes premium because of
purchaser's specific intended use suffices as substantial reliance expenditures); Clackamas County
v. Holmes, 265 Or. 193, 508 P.2d 190 (1973) (costs exclusively related to proposed use suffice
as substantial reliance expenditures); Raum v. Board of Supervisors, 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 9, 370
A.2d 777 (1976) (carrying costs may suffice as substantial reliance expenditures); Western Land
Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980) (surveying expenses do not suffice as
substantial reliance expenditures); Board of Supervisors v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 193
S.E.2d 1 (1972) (purchase price of land that specifically includes special use permit authorization
for specific commercial purpose suffices as substantial reliance expenditures); Board of Supervisors
v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d 799 (1972) (expenses related to preparation
of site plans and bond deposits suffice as substantial reliance expenditures).
Other courts determine whether or not substantial reliance is present by applying a relative
or "ratio test." Under this test a court gauges a landowner's substantial reliance by considering
the relationship between the costs expended and the total costs of the entire project. See, e.g.,
City of Rochester v. Barcomb, 103 N.H. 247, 169 A.2d 281 (1961) (unspecified ratio test applied
and expended costs found insufficient to suffice as substantial reliance expenditures); Town of
Hempstead v. Lynne, 32 Misc. 2d 312, 222 N.Y.S.2d 526 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) ($15,600 out of
$351,340 total project costs does not suffice as substantial reliance expenditure); Clackamas
County v. Holmes, 256 Or. 193, 508 P.2d 190 (1973) (expenditure of costs that are one-fourteenth
of total project costs suffice as substantial reliance expenditures).
117. See SIEMON, supra note 6, at 32-38; Heeter, supra note 6, at 84-88.
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rights were not found to exist." 8 Landscape maintenance costs, security
expenses, carrying costs, and liability insurance'premiums also probably would
not suffice as detrimental reliance expenditures."9 Similarly, professional fees
associated with feasibility studies, market analyses, and environmental, tests
for soil adequacy, ground water availability, and existence of toxic wastes,
would also probably not suffice.'12 Bona fide expenses for subdivision plat
and site plan preparation, filing fees, and nonrefundable bond deposits and
utility tap fees generally would suffice as detrimental reliance expenditures,
but similar expenses for preparation of metes and bounds survey plats
probably would not suffice.'
2'
In cases of development projects that do not require legislative approvals
or ministerial approvals other than a building permit, such as construction
of single family detached residential dwelling units on existing platted lots,
landowners will not expend much money on their projects prior to actual
construction. In such a case, a landowner relying upon a building permit as
his sole governmental approval, who has not commenced excavation or poured
footings, may fall short of demonstrating detrimental reliance and fail to
establish a vested right to complete his project.
In sum, detrimental reliance expenditures must be "real, actual, and
considerable in amount".' 22 In one case pertaining to vested rights, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that detrimental reliance expen-
ditures must be "expensive and permanent."' ' This definition may be the
most useful for the practitioner.
V. MISCELLANEOUS VESTED RIGHTS IssUEs
A. What Vests?
While many courts and commentators have discussed in great detail the
process by which vested rights in land use and development arise, few have
118. See SIEMON, supra note 6, at 35; see, e.g., County Council v. District Land Corp., 274
Md. 691, 337 A.2d 712 (1975) (holding land acquisition expenses insufficient); Gosselin v. City
of Nashua, 114 N.H. 447, 321 A.2d 593 (1974) (holding land acquisition expenses insufficient).
But see, e.g, Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 S.E.2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (holding land acquisition expenses that included premium due to recently acquired zoning
rights sufficient); Board of Supervisors v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 2 (1972)
(holding land acquisition expenses which included premium due to special use permit sufficient).
119. See supra note 116 (citing substantial reliance cases); SMMON, supra note 6, at 33-38.
120. See supra note 116; SIEMoN, supra note 6, at 33-38.
121. See supra note 116 (citing detrimental reliance cases); SIEMON, supra note 6, at 33-38;
Rhodes, supra note 31, at 11-13.
122. SiBmoN, supra note 6, at 32.
123. Saah v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment 433 A.2d 1114, 1116 (D.C.
1981). The authors of one in-depth article on vested rights have recommended a "rule of
irrevocable commitment." See Cunningham & Kramer, supra note 9, at 714-28. This rule, they
assert, would protect any development project to which a landowner has made a reasonable and
irrevocable commitment of resources. Id. at 715. This rule would save courts from the inherent
arbitrariness in applying the quantitative, qualitative, or relative tests for the substantial reliance
element.
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provided clear guidance on exactly which kinds of rights become vested when
a landowner successfully maintains a vested rights claim. Clearly, those
development rights that are critical to the landowner's investment-backed
expectations should be vested and protected from diminishment by zoning
ordinance text and map amendments.1 24 For instance, in those cases where
vesting is premised upon a development plan, approved pursuant to a PUD
rezoning or issuance of a special use permit, or upon a subdivision plan or
site plan, either filed or approved, the land uses and development densities
deserve full protection.12 Arguably, the site layout depicted on the plan also
deserves protection if that precise layout is central to the landowner's devel-
opment scheme.
Difficult vesting questions arise, however, regarding whether or not vested
development plans should be subject to minor changes or revisions to the
zoning subdivision or site plan ordinances. Undoubtedly, government officials
will argue that minor zoning ordinance changes, such as new requirements
for transitional screening, barriers, and landscaping, which may increase a
landowner's development costs but not deprive him of critical development
rights, should be applicable to vested development plans. 26 To avoid these
new minor police power requirements, a landowner will have to argue that
his vested plan exempts his development from all new zoning, subdivision,
or site plan ordinances amendments which are enacted subsequent to this
date of vesting. This extreme position would obtain little judicial sympathy.
If, however, application of new zoning ordinance amendments to the vested
plan would force a fundamental redesign of the proposed project, as would,
for instance, increases in minimum yard, open space, or setback requirements,
the landowner would have a strong position in arguing that his development
should be exempted from the new requirements. In sum, although the
landowner may not obtain exemption from all new regulations through the
acquisition of a vested plan, his legitimate investment-backed expectations,
founded primarily on land use rights and maximum development density
rights, deserve full protection. 2 7
B. Large Multi-Phased or Mixed-Use Project Vesting
During the past twenty years, we have witnessed a great increase in the
complexity and average size of development projects. 28 In response to market
124. See SIMON, supra note 6, at 62-68, Berger, supra note 55, at 765-70, Stoebuck, supra
note 2, at 1083-99.
125. See Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d 799
(1972) (Virginia's "vesting upon filing" rule); Developers' Rights, supra note 19, at 491-94 (PUD
rezoning approval vesting).
126. See Foote, supra note 73, at 8-9. The former County Attorney of Prince William
County, Virginia has suggested that even vested developments should be subject to minor zoning
ordinance amendments. Id.
127. See generally SMMON, supra note 6, at 62-68.
128. See Delancy & Kominers, supra note 11, at 241-48; Witt, supra note 11, at 317-18;
Witt & Sammartino-Gardner, supra note 11, at 647-53.
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pressures for planned, mixed use communities, political pressures for developer
funding of large-scale infrastructure improvements, and economic pressures
for economy-of-scale cost savings, landowners today frequently propose large
mixed-use development projects that will require years and perhaps decades
of full-time planning and construction before completion. 29 Projects of this
nature present unique vested rights issues.
First, large mixed-use development projects almost always require rezoning
legislation, normally of a PUD nature. Few projects of this nature are
accomplished under existing zoning.'30 In many jurisdictions, an amendment
to the adopted comprehensive plan to provide for language supporting the
project will be a practical or political requirement.' Thus, a landowner
desiring development rights to construct a large mixed-use project will be
forced to expend large amounts of money toward planning and feasibility
studies, professional fees, and other "soft" costs prior to rezoning.'32 Second,
after rezoning, the landowner will need to direct his project through a
complicated array of secondary approvals, possibly spending years, before
the first building permit for the project is issued.' Third, the landowner
undoubtedly will be unable to complete the project in one phase given financial
and resource limitations and market saturation constraints.' 34 Incremental,
phased development is necessary. In light of these unique characteristics, the
landowner developing a large mixed-use project faces a tremendous risk of
loss should a government entity amend the zoning ordinance text or map
prior to completion of the project.
In response to these concerns, many courts have found that landowners
of large mixed-use projects deserve greater protection from ordinance changes,
in the forms of earlier vesting standards, than do landowners developing
129. See Witt, supra note 11, at 317-18; Developers' Rights, supra note 19, at 497-508; see
also URBAN LAND INsTrITuTE, LARoE-ScaLE Dar opmENT 3 (1977).
130, See, e.g., Town of Paradise Valley v. Gulf Leisure Corp., 17 Ariz. App. 600, 557
P.2d 532 (1976); Avco Community Dev., Inc. v. South Coastal Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d
785, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 553 P.2d 546 (1976); SiEMoN, supra note 6, at 73-75 (synopsis of
Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, "Flamingo West" vesting case); see also Cunningham &
Kremer, supra note 9, at 627-28.
131. See generally Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 Hv. L. REv.
1154 (1955); Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation,
74 MICH. L. Ray. 899 (1976).
132. See, e.g., Town of Paradise Valley v. Gulf Leisure Corp. 27 Ariz. App. 600, 557 P.2d
532 (1976); Board of County Comm'rs v. Lutz, 314 So. 2d 815, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Cheltenham Township appeal, 413 Pa. 379, 196 A.2d 363 (1964); see also Delaney & Kominers,
sUpra note 11, at 241-42.
133. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coastal Regional Comm'n, 17
Cal. 3d 785, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 553 P.2d 546 (1976); DeKalb County v. Chapel Hill Inc., 232
Ga. 238, 205 S.E.2d 864 (1974); see also SimsoN, supra note 6, at 19-24.
134. See, e.g., Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council, 61 Haw. 390, 606 P.2d 866 (1980);
Rockshire Civic Assn, Inc. v. Mayor of Rockville, 32 Md. App. 22, 358 A.2d 570 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1976); Henry & Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Allenstown, 120 N.H. 910, 424 A.2d 1132
(1980); see also Developers' Rights, supra note 19, at 497-508.
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smaller, less complex projects. 135 The Supreme Courts of the States of Georgia,
Pennsylvania, and Maryland have determined that the realities of large, mixed-
use developments mandate the use of "entire project" vesting standards.
136
In one well-publicized case, however, the California Supreme Court found
that the developer of a 5,234-acre mixed-use project who had expended years
and millions of dollars in obtaining a PUD rezoning and a host of preliminary
approvals possessed no vested development rights to construct his planned
project and could obtain vested rights only on a unit-by-unit basis upon
acquisition of building permits. 137 As discussed below, the blatant unfairness
of this decision led directly to a statewide legislative response.
VI. VESTED RiGHTs IN VmGINIA
The Commonwealth of Virginia possesses a proud history of supporting
private property rights against governmental interference. 3 s The Virginia
Constitution exceeds the United States Constitution in protecting property
rights. The Virginia Constitution prohibits the damaging of private property
by government without the payment of just compensation 39 Moreover, the
Virginia Supreme Court, perhaps in recognition of the propensity of local
governing bodies to derogate private property rights in satisfaction of public
concerns, routinely applies "Dillon's Rule" of strict construction toward the
exercise of local governmental power.'14
In Virginia, the test for vested development rights may be found in two
Virginia Supreme Court Opinions handed down on the same day in 1972.
The two cases, Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Medical Structures,
Inc.'41 and Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Cities Service Oil
135. See generally URBAN LAND INSTrrITE, LARGE-ScALE DEVELOPMENT 3 (1977); Heyman,
Planned Unit Development: The Bargaining Process and Environmental Impact Statement in
FRONTmRS OF PLANNED UNr DEVELoPMENT 154 (1973); Delaney & Kominers, supra note 11, at
241-48, Developers' Rights, supra note 19, at 497-508.
136. See DeKalb County v. Chapel Hill, Inc., 232 Ga. 238, 205 S.E.2d 864 (1974);
Cheltenham Township Appeal, 413 Pa. 379, 196 A.2d 363 (1964); Rockshire Civic Ass'n, Inc.
v. Mayor of Rockville, 32 Md. App. 22, 358 A.2d 570 (1976); see also Delaney & Kominers,
supra note 11, at 24148.
137. See Avco Community Devs., Inc. v. South Coastal Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785,
553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976). See generally SIEMON, supra note 6, at 20-21; Cunningham
& Kremer, supra note 9, at 704-08.
138. See generally V. DABNEY, VmnGtcA: Tim NEw DOMInON (1983); A.E. HoWARD,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA (1974); T.R. MoRuus, TnE VmInaA SUPREME
COuRT: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
139. See VA. CONST., art. 1, § 11.
140. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Home, 216 Va. 113, 215 S.E.2d 453 (1975); Gordon
v. Board of Supervisors, 207 Va. 827, 153 S.E.2d 270 (1967). "Dillon's Rule" provides that
municipal corporations have only those powers expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly
implied therefrom, and those that are essential and indispensable. City of Richmond v. County
Board, 199 Va. 679, 684-85, 101 S.E.2d 641, 645 (1958). By corollary, "Dillon's Rule" also
applies to county boards of supervisors. Home, 216 Va. at 117, 215 S.E.2d at 455.
141. 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d 799 (1972).
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Company,142 both involved Fairfax County landowners who filed bona fide
site plans to establish permissible land uses pursuant to previously issues
special use permits. The Fairfax County Board of Superivors, however, voted
to downzone both landowners' properties subsequent to and probably as a
result of the two site plan filings. In articulating the Virginia rule, Chief
Justice Snead writing for a unanimous court stated:
[W]here, as here, a special use permit has been granted under a
zoning classification, a bona fide site plan has thereafter been filed
and diligently pursued, and substantial expense has been incurred in
good faith before a change in zoning, the permittee then has a vested
right to the land use described in the use permit and he cannot be
deprived of such use by subsequent legislation. 143
The fact that the landowners in Medical Structures and Cities Service
sought to establish permissible land uses pursuant to special use permits rather
than permitted land use allowed by-right has lead to some difficulty in
applying the Virginia rule. Local governments, seeking to restrict the scope
of the Virginia rule, have argued that the governmental act requirement of
both vested rights doctrines is not satisfied in the case of landowners seeking
permitted by-right land uses until the site plan approval.'" In one particular
case, which demonstrates the lengths to which government entities will reach
in order to defeat vested rights, a local government argued that site plan
approval does not suffice as a governmental act until all potential appeals
from that approval are decided.1
45
As previously discussed, a counter intuitive situation appears to exist if
permissible land uses, which are deemed "sometimes appropriate" and allowed
only upon issuance of a special use permit, are allowed vested status upon
site plan filing while permitted land uses, which are deemed "always appro-
priate" and allowed by-right under existing zoning, are not allowed vested
status upon site filing.'" While local governments may admit that their
arguments appear counter intuitive, they stress in support of their arguments
142. 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 1 (1972).
143. Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 358, 192 S.E.2d 799,
801 (1972); Board of Supervisors v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 360, 193 S.E.2d 1, 3
(1972).
144. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
at 50-60, Potomac Greens Assocs. Partnership v. City of Alexandria, Civil Action No. 87-831-
A, (East. Dist. Va., Alex. Div. Oct. 29, 1987). In Potomac Greens the City of Alexandria argued
that a complete bona fide site plan submission for a permitted by-right development was not
vested under the Medical Structures-Cities Service rule because a special permit approval or like
governmental use approval had never been granted. Id.
145. See Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 16, 23, Dominion Lands,
Inc. v. City of Alexandria, Chancery No. 18,106, (Alex. Circ. Ct. Jan. 5, 1988). In Dominion
Lands, the City of Alexandria argued that an approved preliminary site plan was not vested
under the Medical Structure-Cities Service rule because an appeal was filed from the site plan
approval and, during pendency of the appeal, the subject property was lawfully downzoned. Id.
146. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
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that this counter intuitive situation is mandated by a body of Virginia case
law holding that a landowner has no vested rights to the continued existence
of applicable zoning. 47
We believe that Virginia law will not countenance this counter intuitive
situation. As recognized by the Virginia Supreme Court in Medical Structures,
"the site plan has virtually replaced the building permit as the most vital
document in the development process"' 4 and "[t]he filing of such a plan
creates a monument to the developer's intention ... .",49 The critical meaning
of these passages suggests to us that a filed site plan for a permitted use is
no different from a filed site plan for a permissible use and that both uses
deserve the same degree of vesting protection upon bona fide site plan filing.
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, we believe that a Virginia land-
owner seeking a permitted by-right use will stand a better chance of achieving
vested status upon the filing of a bona fide site plan if his property (1) was
recently rezoned on an applicant-sponsored zoning map amendment, 150 (2) is
subject to proffered conditions accepted pursuant to a conditional rezoning,'
or (3) possesses a PUD zoning designation legislated concurrent with approval
of a development plan.
52
One Virginia circuit court has had the opportunity to consider the case
of a landowner who sought vested rights to a permitted by-right use pursuant
to a bona fide site plan filing. The court determined that vested rights did
not exist because the landowner, by her own admission, filed the site plan
two days before her property was downzoned with full knowledge of the
pending downzoning, for the sole purpose of obtaining vested rights, and not
for proceeding forward with actual site development.'53 The circuit court
premised its holding solely upon the landowner's lack of good faith and did
not address whether or not a site plan filing for a permitted by-right use
could service as a basis for vesting under the Medical Structures-Cities Service
rule.'Y4
VII. EpILoGUE-ON Ci ING VESTED RIGHTS
As may be self-evident from the proceeding discussions, the law of vested
rights is both unclear and uncertain. Both landowners and governments are
ill-served by the current uncertainty in the law and often are forced to make
business and policy decisions involving land use without knowing what the
147. See, e.g., Town of Vienna v. Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 244 S.E.2d 542 (1978); Cole v.
City Council, 218 Va. 827, 241 S.E.2d 765 (1978); Nusbaum v. City of Norfolk, 151 Va. 801,
145 S.E. 257 (1928).
148. Medical Structures, 213 Va. at 358, 192 S.E.2d at 801.
149. Id. at 358, 192 S.E.2d at 801.
150. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying test.
152. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
153. See Costello v. Board of Supervisors, Chancery Mo. 83-62 (Fauquier County Circuit
Court, June 22, 1983); see also supra note 112.
154. See supra note 112 (discussing Costello holding).
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ultimate effect these decisions will be. 55 To provide clarity and certainty to
the law, state governments should enact legislation expressly providing when
and how vested rights arise. 5 6 One noted Virginia practitioner suggested:
Such legislation should take the form of a statute providing that
vested rights to the uses of land shall not be abridged and a statute
providing that rights in land uses shall vest upon the filing or
applications for approval of a subdivision plan, a site plan, or a
request for a building permit. 57
In Virginia, vested rights to land uses already are protected from im-
pairment by a statute that regrettably does not specify when and how vested
rights arise. 5 A simple, legislative cure to the vested rights quandary in
Virginia would involve amending this statute to codify the Medical Structures-
Cities Service rule.'5 9 Until such legislation is enacted, landowners seeking to
protect their property rights should be observant of all proposed zoning
155. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Protection Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100-10.1-2115
(1988). During its 1988 term, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a new law empowering a
commission of Virginia citizens to promulgate regulations to protect the Chesapeake Bay. Id. at
§ 10.1-2102. Because this new act mandates that no vested rights may be impacted by the
forthcoming regulations, the commission will be unable to gauge the net effect of its new
regulations due an inability to determine which tidewater lands hold vested development rights.
See id. at § 10.1-2115 (protecting vested rights).
156. See SrEMoN, supra note 6, at 70-86 (discussing legislative remedies); Campanella, Elliott
& Merriam, New Vested Rights Legislation: States Seek to Steady a Shaky Judicial Doctrine, 11
UR.B. L. 81 (1988); Rhodes, supra note 31, at 20-23; Witt, supra note 11, at 327-29; Developers'
Rights, supra note 19, at 508-11; see, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65,684-65,864.5 (West 1988)
(allowing development agreements); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 24-68-101 through 24-68-110 (1988)
(vested rights law); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, §6 (1988) (vested rights law); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§40:55D-49 (vested rights law); 1988 WAsH. LAws ch. 104 (vested rights law); see also MODEL
LANE DEv. CoDE §2-309 (1976) (model vested rights law). a
157. Witt, supra note 11, at 329.
158. See VA. CODE ANN §15.1-491 (1989).
159. For example, Section 15.1-492 could be amended, as follows, to add the following
italized sentence:
Section 15.1-492. VESTED RIGHTS NOT IMPAIRED: NONCONFORMING USES.
Nothing in this article shall be construed to authorize the impairment of any vested right, except
that a zoning ordinance may provide that land, buildings, and structures and the uses thereof
which do not conform to the zoning prescribed for the district in which they are situated may
be continued only so long as the then existing or a more restricted use continues and such use
is not discontinues for more than two years, and so long as the buildings or structures are
maintained in their then structural condition; and that the uses of such building or structures
shall conform to such regulations whenever they are enlarged, extended, reconstructed or
structurally altered and may further provide that no "nonconforming" building or structure may
be moved on the same lot or to any other lot which is not properly zoned to permit such
"nonconforming" use. An owner, contract purchaser, or optionee of property shall be deemed
to have acquired vested rights in the land uses and development densities allowed under the
zoning classification applicable to such property when such owner, contract purchaser, optionee,
or agent therefor has in good faith filed or caused to be filed with the county or municipality a
site plan, plan of development, or plat of subdivision proposing a use allowed under such
classification.
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ordinance changes and be honest and vigilant in securing land use approvals.
As two other land use lawyers noted in a 1979 article, landowners should
abide by the "general rule of thumb that in the development process, 'he
who rests less, vests best."' 16o
160. See Delaney & Kominers, supra note 11, at 248.
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